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The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is known 
internationally for its vast mineral resources, its wars 
and the conflict-related sexual violence that has 
affected the lives of a very large number of victims. With 
growing awareness on the phenomena, the number of 
programmes addressing sexual violence in DRC has 
grown, with remarkable achievements in diminishing 
taboos, helping victims in healing, and criminalising and 
prosecuting perpetrators. 
However, over the past five years questions have emerged 
about the effects and effectiveness of sexual violence 
response programmes. This motivated research that the 
authors of this report conducted in 2011. The research 
revealed a number of negative effects related to the 
complexity of the problem, the political, social and cultural 
context in DRC, and false assumptions and biases in 
the interventions. Based on our findings, we argued 
that sexual violence in DRC was often understood as 
a single-cause, single-type phenomenon (rape caused 
by conflict), without taking the complex context into 
consideration. We also noted that programmes too 
often dealt with symptoms rather than contributing 
factors, and failed to include broader themes and wider 
community needs. This risked creating false victims and 
parallel services. Furthermore, coordination was poor and 
sexual violence assistance was largely detached from 
overall development planning. Finally, the interventions 
in the justice sector failed to ensure the independent 
functioning of Congolese legal actors and often created 
unfair trials. 
In 2011 most of these critiques had already been 
identified by Congolese stakeholders and some 
international actors, but they had not yet been openly 
debated. As this was expected to change, this follow-
up research was conducted in 2014 to identify what 
happened to the sexual violence response three years 
later, addressing the following questions: 
 ■ How has the engagement of responding actors and 
their approaches to sexual violence in eastern DRC 
evolved since 2011?
 ■ How have practices of sexual violence assistance 
evolved in eastern DRC?
 ■ What are the social effects of increased legal action 
against sexual violence in urban areas of eastern 
DRC? 
 ■ How can sexual violence assistance programmes be 
improved? 
Methodology of the research and report structure
In May 2014, 49 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with representatives of organisations 
responding to sexual violence (UN, international NGOs, 
Congolese NGOs), political actors, legal professionals and 
donor structures. There were also 10 focus groups with 
57 respondents, some in rural areas with a high density 
of NGO programmes, as well as with urban respondents 
largely removed from NGO activity. Recent publications 
(from 2011 to mid-2014) were analysed by an intern 
from the University of Amsterdam. Funds available for 
sexual violence were also reviewed. Finally, 46 legal files 
of sexual violence cases in five different civil and military 
jurisdictions at first degree and appeal level in South 
Kivu were studied. There was also follow-up on 18 out of 
the 40 files examined in 2011. All of the data have been 
coded and analysed through the use of N-vivo. 
Background to sexual and gender-based violence 
in Congo
The narrative of sexual violence in DRC has been 
reductionist in nature, mainly addressing rape and 
focusing on its relation with conflict (the ‘rape as a 
weapon of war’ discourse). Conflict-related sexual 
violence in DRC is indeed real and the presence of a 
large number of rebel groups in the Kivus, along with 
increasingly decentralised recurring armed conflict, 
continues to claim new victims. Several scholars, 
however, have found that sexual violence is much less 
organised than the ‘weapon’ discourse evokes, and 
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that this discourse obscures understanding of sexual 
violence. Also, a single focus on conflict-related sexual 
violence normalises other forms of violence, including 
other forms of sexual violence. And the emphasis on 
female victimhood means that male victims do not get 
recognised. 
Owing in part to civil society lobbying, DRC now has a 
comprehensive legal framework on gender and sexual 
violence (including ratification of important international 
conventions). However, customary practice continues to 
box women in a secondary position, whether it concerns 
the institutional domain (women’s leadership) or socio-
economic participation. Norms around masculinity, 
in part influenced by warfare and its consequences, 
further shape practices of sexual ‘access’ to women. Yet, 
it must be recognised that the realities of non-conflict 
sexual violence in DRC may not be so different from 
those in other countries that score higher on the social 
development index and are not affected by conflict. 
Engagement and approaches of actors 
responding to sexual violence
Intervening actors: The 2011 report noted that there 
were hundreds of organisations working on sexual 
violence, both at the international and community level. 
In 2014 their number had not diminished, but the volume 
of activities had gone down. This is part of a wider trend 
of reduced funding for Congolese NGOs. As in 2011, 
intervention strategies were still mainly guided by the 
2009 national strategy and orientation provided by the 
thematically organised working-group system of UN 
agencies. 
Coordination: The previous report criticised organisations 
for victim appropriation and duplication of efforts. 
Efforts to coordinate sexual violence assistance and 
referencing of victims had greatly improved since 2011. 
The Ministry of Gender has taken greater ownership in 
guiding coordination, stimulating alignment of the UN 
working groups with provincial coordination structures. 
Several respondents were satisfied with improved 
coordination of medical assistance, with the Ministry of 
Health cited as a strong partner. What stood out was the 
lack of engagement with parliamentary representatives, 
who claimed to have an interest in collaborating with 
NGOs but felt left out of discussions. Their attachment 
to geographical constituencies and the realities on 
the ground would make them an interesting partner to 
engage with. 
Prevalence: The 2011 report found there was a 
preoccupation with reporting on the scale of the problem 
through statistics. However, data collection and analysis 
was problematic, including problems with extrapolation 
to the wider context, overlapping datasets, false reports 
of cases, and perverse incentives to report cases. Media 
headlines further contributed to reductionist information. 
The report concluded that statistics should be used 
with the utmost care, complemented with qualitative 
and contextualised information to avoid distortion and 
encourage transparency. This conclusion continued to be 
valid in 2014. Improvements had, however, been noted 
since a specific working group on data gathering and 
analysis was initiated in 2012, spearheaded by the UN 
Population Fund (UNFPA). No major change in the number 
of sexual violence cases reported was observed. 
Changing views and approaches: Over the past few 
years, international policy attention on sexual violence 
has remained high, as a 2013 G8 declaration, new UN 
resolutions, and an international summit on sexual 
violence in London showed. The International Criminal 
Court (ICC) has also intensified its prosecution of 
Congolese warlords. Attention to sexual violence in DRC 
continued to relay the rape as a weapon of war discourse. 
A significant number of international NGOs also presented 
a similar discourse on their websites, even though actual 
programming was less geared to conflict-related violence 
than in 2011. 
Organisations increasingly emphasised sexual violence 
committed by civilians, impunity, women’s empowerment 
as a means to reduce vulnerability, and the need to target 
men as allies in fighting sexual violence and changing 
social norms. Organisations have incorporated broader 
gender notions, moved to address gender-based violence 
in geographical areas that are currently more peaceful, 
and tried to embed sexual violence responses in other 
programming. 
Funding for sexual violence: Based on data from 
the major Multi Donor Trust Funds, there was a clear 
decrease in funding available to DRC over the 2012-
2013 period as compared to 2010-2011. Trust funds 
on peacebuilding and security sector reform have been 
reduced, adding further evidence to the finding that 
attention to the conflict-related causes of sexual violence 
have diminished. The Stabilisation and Recovery Funding 
Facility (SRFF) on sexual violence had a same proportion 
of the total as before. Other large programmes on sexual 
violence represented a budget of $124 million between 
2009 and 2015. As there was an increasing tendency to 
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incorporate sexual violence assistance in other domains 
(for example, health), actual available funds may continue 
without being earmarked as such. The Congolese state 
budget on gender (and its actual disbursement) had 
increased in comparison to 2011, yet continued to be 
marginal compared to international engagement. 
The 2014 research found an evolution in understanding 
sexual violence and increasing embeddedness in broader 
gender and health approaches. This has had many 
positive effects, yet also created some new problems. In 
particular, it has complicated monitoring on the effects 
of programming on the prevalence of sexual violence. In 
addition, it has increased the gap between international 
policy representation of the issue (still emphasising the 
weapon of war component) and realities of programme 
implementation on the ground. 
Sexual violence response
Immediate response to rape in conflict settings:  
While there was activity to follow up emergency cases, 
the issue of under-servicing these cases was generally 
acknowledged, for example in the case of the Beni area 
where Allied Democratic Forces-Nalu (ADF-Nalu) were 
abusing victims at the time of research. This confirmed 
findings from 2011 that sexual violence programming has 
been much more focused on reachable areas, relatively 
close to the provincial capitals, with an increased focus on 
community/civilian forms of sexual violence to the extent 
that conflict-related sexual violence may be neglected. 
Medical response: With regard to medical response, 
four major findings stood out in 2014. Firstly, there was 
increased effort (especially by the specialised hospitals 
Panzi and Heal Africa) to introduce one-stop centres with 
all facilities related to sexual violence collected under one 
roof. Many respondents feared that this would reinforce 
the creation of parallel structures and leave other health 
issues unaddressed. Secondly, an opposite trend among 
some donors was to strengthen the capacities of regular 
health services in order to mainstream care for sexual 
violence. This generated discussion about the extent 
of free medical services for violated women. Thirdly, 
the 2011 report raised attention to the fact that only 
around 3% of fistulas operated on by Panzi and Heal 
Africa have been directly caused by sexual violence, while 
international funding and media categorised nearly all 
fistulas as caused by rape. Even though more recognition 
of this issue could be observed in the current report, 
there remained a lack of attention and means for the 
main cause of fistula: childbirth in dire conditions or by 
very young women. Fourthly, in past years there was a 
high level of distribution of post-exposure prophylaxis 
(PEP) kits (against HIV contamination) for women affected 
by sexual violence. This over-supply created misuse 
(selling parts of the content), but recent improvements in 
coordination of the PEP-kit distribution under auspices of 
the Ministry of Health had improved this situation. 
Psycho-social assistance: Statistics claimed that more 
than 90% of victims received psycho-social assistance, 
yet this was considered by many respondents the 
weakest sector. In many cases this may have been limited 
to a single session. Much assistance in 2014 was still 
taking shape through listening projects (maison d’écoute). 
Specialised care, for example to deal with post-traumatic 
stress syndrome, remained largely absent. 
Socio-economic reintegration: This type of service 
targeted very few women and was mostly shaped through 
the provision of some material incentive, such as a small 
monetary incentives or food items, on top of medical care. 
The trend had shifted to ‘autonomisation’ (self-reliance), 
with attention on saving and credit initiatives, as well as 
micro-business development at community level, rather 
than focusing on individual beneficiaries. 
Capacity development for prevention: A large variety of 
awareness raising and training for institutions, women 
and communities on topics related to sexual violence 
(assistance) has been organised. A lack of coordination, 
however, led to duplication. The duration and quality of 
trainers was contested, especially by professional target 
groups. 
Aid effectiveness and appropriateness: The 2014 
findings confirmed a trend identified in 2011 that people 
inside and especially outside of NGOs shared a frustration 
over the lack of results from the many millions of dollars 
invested in sexual violence assistance and other domains 
of aid. The special attention to sexual violence has fed 
frustration about other development needs not being 
covered, or other serious crimes not being addressed. 
This caused some people to form negative opinions about 
action against sexual violence.
Legal action against sexual violence
Progress in legal action against sexual violence was 
observed in the 2014 research as more cases came 
before justice and the quality of proceedings improved. 
However, the Congolese justice system continued to 
be characterised by high levels of corruption and weak 
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investigation capacities. High-ranking officers and 
resourceful civilians continued to escape justice or prison 
and victims did not receive compensation. 
The Minova trial had become a case in point. The mass 
rape committed by the Congolese army was tried by a 
military court but led only to few convictions of lower-
ranked personnel. Whereas this could be blamed partly 
on assumptions that all suspects were guilty, it appeared 
that problems had mainly occurred in the pre-judicial 
phase with a poor level of investigation and evidence. 
Types of legal support: Legal assistance was in a large 
majority of cases limited to providing basic advice 
on legal rights. Only rarely did it concern actual legal 
accompaniment of victims. Added to the impunity 
challenges addressed above, actual court cases 
on sexual violence were low in number. A number of 
projects were intended to strengthen the presence 
and functioning of legal institutions, especially in rural 
areas. A lot of support continued to be channelled to the 
organisation of mobile courts (where jurisdiction travels to 
rural areas for trial). The 2011 report observed perverse 
effects of these mobile courts for the independence 
of jurisdiction (pressure to convict, payments made 
to legal staff, cases selected by NGOs rather than the 
court) and the potential unfairness of trials (no defence 
for the suspects, short duration affecting the quality of 
proceedings). In 2014 significant improvements were 
noted, with the initiative for mobile courts largely restored 
to legal institutions, motivation payments harmonised, 
and the accused’s right to a defence more effectively 
assured. 
Sexual violence against minors: In 2014 there appeared 
to be a growing trend of sexual violence cases being 
reported in which one or both parties were adolescents 
of minor age. These were referred to as ‘cas de copinage’ 
(boyfriend-girlfriend). The North Kivu prosecutor 
estimated these represented 90% of all cases reported 
to police, especially in urban settings. Such cases posed 
a dilemma. On the one hand the law defines (any attempt 
to have) sex with a minor as a crime that should be 
prosecuted. On the other hand, certain legal practitioners 
called for greater liberty in dealing with this type of case. 
Comparative analysis of sexual violence cases: 
46 recent court cases on sexual violence from five 
jurisdictions in South Kivu were examined (two first-
degree civil tribunals, a military tribunal, the civil appeal 
court, and the military high court). They represented 
cases registered and dealt with between 2012 and 
2013 where the files were physically present (many more 
cases were registered but files had disappeared). The 
investigators were refused access to pre-judicial files 
(prosecutor level). In addition, 18 cases that resulted in 
2011 in conviction were re-analysed. 
As in 2011, all but two cases concerned rape as other 
types of sexual violence are hardly filed. The age of the 
victim and relationship between the parties seemed to 
confirm that at least a quarter of the cases concerned 
copinage. No improvement was noted with regard to 
the respect of legal timeframe, as nearly all cases vastly 
surpassed the three-month limit fixed for sexual violence. 
With regard to evidence present in files, a general 
improvement was noted – especially concerning the 
presence of medical reports (absent in 41% of the cases 
in 2014, as compared to 75% in 2011). The percentage 
of convictions increased from 60% to 80%. As in 2011, 
motivations for acquittal were relatively well developed, 
but in 2014 the quality of motivations for conviction had 
significantly improved. The type of penalties remained the 
same (and are quite severe) and compensation payments 
continued not to be made. Even though the overall quality 
of proceedings improved, progress was mainly noted 
for the appeal courts and to a lesser degree the military 
tribunal. For the civil tribunal, only one in eight judgements 
was deemed to have sufficient grounds for the conclusion 
reached. 
As for the 18 cases that resulted in conviction in 2011, 
four out of the five convicts whose term officially ended 
in the meantime were still in prison by 2014. On average, 
they served two years beyond their initial penalty, which 
constituted a clear violation of their rights. None of the 
12 eligible cases received conditional liberty. None of the 
14 cases convicted to a compensation payment actually 
paid the victim. In spite of a general belief that sexual 
violence convicts escape en masse, of the 13 convicts 
whose term had not yet finished by 2014, only one was 
no longer in prison. The sample only concerned poor men 
and low-ranking military personnel, confirming claims that 
influential perpetrators never make it before justice. 
Social practices around legal cases on sexual violence: 
The 2011 report found evidence of people framing 
disputes or failed consensual relations as rape, in 
order to take revenge or gain material benefit. In 2014, 
more traces were found of such practices, for example 
in the many cases of copinage. Rumours about policy 
involvement in framing rape cases for purposes of 
extortion had swelled between 2011 and 2014. A focus 
group of Bukavu youths reported wariness to engage in 
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love relationships out of fear of being accused. Cases of 
abuse and fake police-cases over sexual violence claims 
increase the risk ordinary that citizens stop seeing sexual 
violence as a serious problem.
Conclusion
The response to sexual violence in eastern DRC peaked 
around 2012, but since then a reduction has set in. 
In 2011, many perverse effects were observed, as it 
invited misuse of funds at all levels of society. One of 
the questions informing this report was how this would 
continue? Would the negative effects become more 
dominant? Or could this hype usher in more serious 
attention to gender issues in DRC?
We find that attention to sexual violence has indeed 
become more regulated and coordination has improved, 
including with regard to the engagement of the Congolese 
government. The approaches of actors dealing with 
sexual violence have changed. There has been more 
attention for other forms of gender-based violence, 
women’s empowerment and leadership. Victim-oriented 
support has largely transformed into community-based 
responses. There is also more recognition of other 
medical needs. 
However, the discrepancy between international rhetoric 
and realities on the ground is large, with international 
representations still focusing on the conflict-related rape. 
This is problematic from an ethical point of view, comes 
at the expense of transparency, and makes it difficult to 
scrutinise programmes for their effectiveness. 
The gap between the discourse and practice of sexual 
violence response has been widened. A major concern 
remains that the fight against impunity has found a 
way in the political economy of survival and corruption, 
especially in the cities, where accusations of sexual 
violence are often used for revenge or extortion. Citizen 
disengagement with the issue of sexual violence has 
become stronger as a result. 
Recommendations
On the basis of this report, the following 
recommendations are made: 
 ■ Be more transparent about sexual violence response: 
International agencies should review the conflict-
related sexual violence discourse to match it better to 
local realities of violence and their programmes to end 
violence, including more precise theories of change. 
 ■ Develop a comprehensive policy on sexual violence 
response: The government, together with the UN, 
should develop a clear strategy on sexual violence 
response and clarify how the creation of parallel 
services through one-stop approaches relate to policy 
perspectives of the health system, including free service 
provision. 
 ■ Be more transparent on fistula operations: 
Notwithstanding the enormous benefits of specialised 
hospitals, it is important to become more transparent 
about fistula causes which should lead to more 
attention to reproductive health care.
 ■ Review sectoral sexual violence response: In light 
of substantial turnaround of public funds and private 
donations for sexual violence, concerns ought to be 
externally and transparently evaluated, throughout 
the sector. Topics that stand out are: the methods and 
effectiveness of psycho-social response; the practices 
and effectiveness of training facilities; the coverage 
and effectiveness of response in armed encounters/
rebel attacks; and attention to male victims of sexual 
violence. 
 ■ Continue capacity development of the medical and 
legal sector: Despite improvements in medical and legal 
response, capacity development of these sectors is of 
paramount importance (e.g. pre-judicial investigative 
capacities, respect for the rights of suspects). This is a 
much broader concern than sexual violence alone and 
should also address the health sector. 
 ■ Have an honest discussion on the social effects of 
the fight against impunity: Thanks to the attention 
to fighting impunity, many cases are brought to court 
that in fact concern cases of copinage (consensual 
relations). The question is whether this is desirable. The 
exclusively legal approach to sexual violence should at 
least be accompanied by more educational approaches 
on contraceptives and reproductive rights.
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The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is known for its 
vast mineral resources, its wars and its conflict-related 
sexual violence. During the wars of the 1990s, large 
numbers of women were subjected to violent forms of 
rape and sexual mutilation. The victims’ lives were often 
destroyed: they suffered physically and mentally and 
risked social rejection by their families and communities. 
Terms like ‘endemic’, ‘sexual terrorism, and ‘the war 
within the war’ have been used to describe these acts.1 
In later years, in addition to sexual violence committed 
by non-Congolese armed groups, sexual abuse by the 
Congolese army or rebel groups appeared to increase 
and, more recently, rape-crimes by civilians have said to 
be increased. Sexual violence continues to have a high 
prevalence in the country.
Especially since the 2002-2003 peace agreements, a 
large and growing number of programmes have been 
implemented to end sexual violence in DRC and provide 
services to the victims. In an unprecedented way, the 
international community, civilian forces and the Congolese 
government and judiciary have pushed an agenda to 
fight impunity, provide service to victims and create 
consciousness in society that women who have suffered 
abuse deserve justice rather than stigmatisation. The 
concerted efforts of these different actors have led 
to numerous medical programmes, court cases, and 
education activities despite a context of insecurity and 
an institutional landscape that is considered among the 
weakest in the world, in a country scoring extremely poorly 
on the human development index. 
Despite the remarkable achievements, over the course of 
years, people in DRC and staff engaged in sexual violence 
programmes have raised a number of questions about 
the practices that had evolved to combat sexual violence. 
These questions concerned the way the issue was framed, 
the focus of the programmes, and forms of abuse of these 
programmes on all levels. It was often heard that sexual 
violence had become a ‘fond de commerce’ (business). 
This expression became the name of the report we wrote 
in 2012 on the responses to sexual violence (Douma 
and Hilhorst, 2012).2 The report, based on the 2011 
research, revealed a number of negative side-effects of 
programmes against sexual violence that were related 
to the complexity of the problem, the political, social and 
cultural context in DRC, and false assumptions and biases 
1 RFDA, 2005 quoted in Bastick et al (2007, p.41).
2 For the 2011 research 58 key informants were interviewed from UN 
agencies, (inter)national NGOs, state actors and representatives of the legal 
system. In addition 40 legal cases of sexual violence were analysed from six 
jurisdictions in South Kivu.
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in the interventions. It argued that responses should be 
based on the broader socio-cultural dimensions of sexual 
violence in DRC, should be better coordinated, and better 
connect to long-term development approaches to address 
root causes of sexual violence. The main recommendation 
was that the aid sector would perform a rigorous review of 
its sexual violence response. 
This report concerns follow-up research on the responses 
to sexual violence in DRC. The fieldwork was done in 
2014, three years after the previous research, because 
we wanted to follow what happened to sexual violence 
response (and the sectoral evaluation we recommended 
has not yet happened). The problems revealed in our 
previous report were mainly voiced by staff members of 
relevant organisations and surrounding actors. The fact 
that the problems had already been identified (although 
rarely addressed in public) made us confident that there 
were changes underway, and this follow-up research 
provided an opportunity to see how the response had 
evolved over three years. Special attention has been 
paid to the effects of legal action, which was especially 
problematic in the previous research. This report aims to 
identify recent trends in sexual violence response and its 
societal effects, and addresses the following questions:
 ■ How has the engagement of responding actors and 
their approaches to sexual violence in eastern DRC 
evolved since 2011?
 ■ How have practices of sexual violence assistance 
evolved in eastern DRC?
 ■ What are the social effects of increased legal action 
against sexual violence in urban areas of eastern DRC? 
 ■ How can sexual violence assistance programmes be 
improved? 
The scope of this report is limited to DRC. Many of 
the issues discussed in this report may equally apply 
elsewhere, but a systematic comparative analysis was 
outside of the scope of the research. The report will be 
particularly relevant to other conflict-affected areas 
with a high prevalence of sexual violence and sexual 
violence programming. At the same time, it is important 
to emphasise that there is a wide body of literature not 
reviewed here that shows that problems with sexual 
violence and justice are not limited to conflict-affected 
countries that score low on the human development index. 
This research is partly motivated by the importance we 
attach to the opinions of Congolese people with regard to 
issues of sexual violence and the responses it triggers. 
This rests on the idea that success in combatting sexual 
violence will ultimately depend on the willingness of 
people within DRC to address the issue. Apart from 
Congolese respondents in international and national 
agencies, we have conducted a number of focus group 
discussions in communities in and around Bukavu (South 
Kivu) and Goma (North Kivu).
Before reviewing the issues of sexual violence in DRC, 
gender relations and the security situation, this section 
first summarises our previous report. 
1.1 Summary of the Fond de Commerce report 
Between September and December 2011, the authors 
of this report conducted research to understand how 
actors in the field of sexual violence assistance interpret 
the problem and define intervention strategies, and 
how these programmes trigger certain unintended 
outcomes and adverse societal responses. While the 
high prevalence of sexual violence in DRC and the need 
to eradicate it stood unquestioned, the research was 
initiated in response to growing discomfort about the side 
effects of programmes against sexual violence. 
The research addressed: 
 ■ The framing of sexual violence in DRC.
 ■ The ways the understanding of violence was 
translated into programmes.
 ■ The accumulated and unintended effects of medical, 
social and economic assistance to victims of sexual 
violence.
 ■ The accumulated and unintended effects of legal 
assistance to victims of sexual violence. 
The report was based on a document review, 58 
interviews and the study of 40 legal case files. The 
interviews were held in South and North Kivu and the 
legal cases were examined from courts in North Kivu. 
We focused on these two provinces because of the 
concentration of assistance programmes there. The 
research concerned the ensemble of interventions, not 
specific programmes. Main findings included:
 ■ Conflict-related sexual violence: Sexual violence was 
in DRC mostly seen and represented by international 
media as extremely brutal, conflict-related rape. 
This led to large numbers of international agencies 
addressing sexual violence in DRC. They failed to 
acknowledge that war-related sexual violence also 
affects men, and male victims were rarely assisted. 
Political and military structures and practices that (in 
part related to the legacy of the war) were among the 
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causal problems of sexual violence, yet preventive 
actions such as the reform of armed forces, however, 
received little attention.
 ■ Non-conflict sexual violence: The conflict-related 
interpretation of sexual violence in DRC was narrow 
and failed to recognise that sexual violence was 
mainly happening among civilians. 
 ■ The use of statistics: There were many problems with 
data gathering and analysis. There was a general 
assumption that the taboo on sexual violence led 
to under-reporting, yet we also found many factors 
leading to inflated statistics. These included deliberate 
exaggeration for fund-raising, double counts of victims 
receiving assistance from multiple sources, medical 
treatment of non-victims in need of care, women 
falsely posing as victims and multiple registrations 
by beneficiaries of programmes. Data were often not 
specific on types of sexual violence, localities of data 
collection, and the timeframe of reported offenses. 
The unwarranted extrapolation of data and one-liner 
media representations reinforced the stereotypical 
notion of war-related brutal rape. The subsequent 
representations of the DRC as the ‘rape capital of the 
world’ undermined the constituency of Congolese 
actors working to combat sexual violence. 
 ■ Actors and budgets: The large budgets available for 
combating sexual violence had led to a multiplication of 
organisations on the ground that were not sufficiently 
coordinated or monitored. Initiatives ranged from 
the sincere and professional to “gold-diggers” using 
human suffering to obtain funds. International funds 
completely overwhelmed government resources for 
addressing sexual violence, contributing to a notion 
that the attention to sexual violence was imposed and 
managed by international actors. 
 ■ Budgets and approaches: Analysis of sexual violence 
budgets revealed that these were highly directed 
to curative assistance to victims of violence. Much 
less attention was given to addressing gender 
relations and cultural practices at the community 
level, strengthening women’s positions and fostering 
women’s leadership, and addressing continuing 
problems in the domain of security, peacebuilding 
and justice. The budgets available to sexual violence 
under Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) were high 
compared to, for example, budgets for general health 
programmes, education and security sector reform.
 ■ The type of assistance: Most projects claimed to 
adopt a holistic approach to assistance, seeking to 
combine medical, psycho-social, economic and legal 
assistance to victims. However, the programmes 
displayed humanitarian-style short durations and 
an emphasis on assisting individual victims. This 
was seen to hinder more preventive, socio-cultural 
and community-based interventions. Targeting 
programmes on victims of sexual violence was 
especially problematic in medical care, where sexual 
violence programmes in practice compensated for 
the lack of reproductive health facilities. The two 
most renowned hospitals for the treatment of fistulas 
estimated that only a few cases were the result of 
rape, while the others resulted from complications in 
childbirth.3
 ■ Awareness raising: These programmes highlighted 
messages that sexual violence is not tolerated and 
would be punished, and that victims are never to be 
blamed. This was complicated in the case of the many 
acts considered sexual violence according to the 
law but not in customary practice. Importantly, it led 
to cases where disputes resulting from consensual 
relations were transformed into fabricated 
accusations of sexual violence. 
 ■ Beneficiary identification: The emphasis on numbers 
in project management had created a situation where 
beneficiaries were ‘appropriated’ by organisations 
to justify activities and expenditures. Beneficiary 
identification usually prioritised accessible areas, 
which became ‘assistance-hubs’ at the expense of 
under-served localities. A situation evolved where 
services were reserved for victims of sexual violence, 
leading to widespread false reporting when all 
beneficiaries were counted as victims. International 
agencies maintained that programmes were ‘abuse-
proof’ because the stigma attached to rape would 
inhibit the presentation of fake cases. None of the 
Congolese respondents supported this view. They 
maintained that women in dire need of medical of 
socio-economic assistance would pretend to be a 
victim of sexual violence. 
 ■ Governance and the legal system: The impunity of 
sexual violence, associated with imperfections in 
the legal system and corruption in relation to arrest 
and prosecution, had led to many initiatives to bring 
rape suspects to court. However, the response 
mechanisms continued to be governed by the same 
Congolese justice system. Justice continued to be 
complicated to achieve and seemed to lead to new 
biases towards convicting suspects of sexual violence 
3 Heal Africa reported that 3% resulted from rape. Panzi Hospital reported only 
one out of 350 cases of 2010.
4 www.securelivelihoods.org
that were vulnerable in terms of their age, socio-
economic position and – in the case of military – low 
ranks. The 19 convictions from 40 cases that were 
reviewed all lacked crucial evidence. None of the 
files contained evidence of medical examinations. 
Our legal experts considered 50% of the convictions 
ungrounded from a legal procedure perspective.
 ■ Legal support by NGOs and the judicial treatment 
of sexual violence cases: NGO support to the justice 
sector took shape through training, programmes 
to improve working conditions, accompanying rape 
cases and financially supporting the organisation of 
public hearings (chambre foraine). While the culture 
of impunity was changing, it resulted in a system that 
was biased towards producing rape convictions, with 
the rights of suspects severely breached. Judicial 
actors felt pressured by the zero-tolerance policy of 
the government, NGO advocacy and public opinion 
to convict suspects. As a result, they disregarded 
actual evidence, especially when NGOs were paying 
for the mobile court hearings and selecting the 
cases to be heard. 
 
The different processes that we observed were strongly 
inter-related and set into motion a negative spiral, 
whereby sexual violence evoked responses that were 
prone to abuse by organisations and misuse by victims 
(and non-victims). This in turn led to exaggerated figures 
that added to the statistics evoking a further response. 
This had several consequences. Importantly, it eroded the 
Congolese constituency for combating sexual violence. 
It directed the attention away from the socio-cultural 
gender relations in which much sexual violence is rooted. 
It led to cynicism with the result that real victims of sexual 
violence were no longer heard. It led to biased problem 
statements, policies and programmes that failed to 
address the domestic character of sexual violence, the 
lack of reproductive health, the prevention of teenage 
pregnancies, the malfunctioning of justice and the dire 
poverty underlying requests for assistance. 
The report recommended that:
 ■ sexual violence had to be understood in context, 
and not be limited to a single cause–single type 
phenomenon (rape caused by the conflict)
 ■ assistance programmes needed stronger embedding 
in longer-term development approaches addressing 
development, security and gender relations 
 ■ the mandate of sexual violence assistance should be 
made more inclusive of broader themes and target 
groups to avoid would-be victims and parallel services
 ■ interventions in the justice sector needed to ensure 
the independent functioning of Congolese legal actors 
and should guarantee fair and equal procedures for 
all parties involved 
 ■ coordination of sexual violence programmes needed 
to be improved and made more integral to overall 
development planning. 
1.2 Sexual and gender-based violence in DRC 
The significance of this research has been underpinned 
by several recent publications. 
In an influential article in African Affairs in 2012, Séverine 
Autesserre demonstrated how the complexity of conflicts 
in DRC has been reduced to three interdependent 
narratives: that the cause of violence is the illegal 
exploitation of mineral resources, the main consequence 
is sexual abuse of women and girls, and the central 
solution the extension of state authority (Autesserre, 
2012). As a result, she argues, well-meaning international 
interventions have perverse effects. The paper states: 
Rape is the main theme of countless media reports 
on the Congo. According to an insider, since 2009, 
there has been no interest in the DRC at the United 
Nations (UN) Security Council except when it 
discussed incidents of mass rapes and potential 
responses to them. Similarly, United States State 
Department top officials reportedly pay no attention 
to the DRC except when sexual violence grabs the 
headlines. As a result, visiting a hospital treating 
victims of sexual abuse (notably the Panzi hospital 
in Bukavu or Heal Africa in Goma) seems to have 
become an obligatory stop during diplomatic visits 
to the eastern Congo, to the point that aid workers on 
the ground find it appalling. (2012: 214)
She also notes that ‘sexual violence is such a buzzword 
that many foreign and Congolese organisations insert 
references to it in all kinds of project proposals to 
increase their chances of obtaining funding.’ (ibid) While 
the international focus has brought about assistance, it 
also led to unintentionally counterproductive results. The 
article points to the neglect of other-than-sexual-violence 
victims as well as male victims, who are estimated to 
constitute 4-10% of rape victims. The paper analyses the 
narrative of sexual violence in the context of a broader 
reductionist story on DRC, yet does not analyse specific 
response programmes.
The issue of male victims has been highlighted in recent 
Getting the balance right?
Sexual violence response in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A comparison between 2011 and 2014
5Researching livelihoods and services affected by conflict
years, particularly through the work of the Refugee Law 
Project in Uganda and DRC. United Nations Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 marked international 
recognition of the effects of war on women with special 
attention to sexual violence, but was silent on the subject 
of male victims.4 Only 13 years later, a subsequent 
UNSCR on sexual violence recognised (in a few words) 
that sexual violence also affects men and boys (Dolan, 
2014). Male victims of sexual violence experience 
additional problems compared to women because their 
problems are not easily recognised. Few dare to speak 
out, out of shame or fear, and their abuse is associated 
with homosexuality which is illegal or unacceptable in 
many countries. Despite the overwhelming attention 
to sexual violence in DRC, the number of programmes 
directed at male victims is very small. Because the 
respondents in our study usually worked on sexual 
response programmes aimed exclusively at women, the 
issue of male victims of sexual violence is unfortunately 
also hardly addressed in this report. 
The issue of sexual violence in DRC was raised in relation 
to the series of wars that started in 1996, and over the 
course of the early 2000s it became clear that it affected 
large number of women. A study conducted by Peterman 
and others alarmingly estimated that 1.8 million women 
had been raped in DRC (Peterman et al., 2011). The 
numbers provided by that report have been contested,5 
yet they continue to be widely cited and contributed to 
the notion of DRC as the rape capital of the world. Sexual 
violence in DRC was soon framed in the discourse of 
‘rape as a weapon of war’, which came about in relation to 
ethnic cleansing through rape during the war in the former 
republic of Yugoslavia (1992-1995). The phrase is now 
broadly used to refer to sexual violence committed against 
women in a context of war (Kleppe Bolseth, 2013: 32-33).6 
The ‘rape as a weapon of war’ line was very powerful 
in generating international policy attention for sexual 
violence, yet has in some respects also become a 
misleading statement for guiding policy. Olijuic pointed out 
how sexual violence in former Yugoslavia could be used 
to terrorise women precisely because of the concepts of 
‘honor, shame and sexuality that are attached to women’s 
bodies in peacetime’ (Ojulic, 1998: 31-32). Eriksson-
Baaz and Stern found that sexual violence is much less 
4 For more information on UNSC resolutions referencing sexual violence see 
Dammers (2010). 
5 The extrapolation was particularly contested, and in addition the report was 
often misread. The numbers included domestic violence and forced marital sex, 
whereas they were often cited as if they all constituted conflict-affected rape. 
6  See www.ohchr.org/en/newsevents/pages/rapeweaponwar.aspx. 
organised than the discourse of a ‘weapon’ evokes, and 
that the discourse obscures a good understanding of 
sexual violence. Cohen et al. argue that the rape as a 
weapon of war discourse is generally guided by a number 
of misconceptions (Cohen et al., 2013). These include 
that victims are always female and perpetrators male, 
that rape is ubiquitous in war, that it is an African problem, 
that it is more common among rebel groups than the state 
army, and that high prevalence indicates it is a strategy 
of war. One of the effects of the ‘weapon of war’ line is 
that it has a single focus on the causal effects of war, and 
normalises other forms of violence, including other forms 
of sexual violence (Eriksson-Baaz and Stern, 2013). It 
precludes attention to sexual violence committed by state 
authorities in peacetime, as part of interrogations and 
torture (Freedom from Torture, 2014). It has also become 
clear in DRC that today’s sexual violence perpetrators 
are mainly civilians. While this can be partly attributed to 
secondary effects of war (for instance, when perpetrators 
are traumatised former combatants), sexual violence 
is also related to other issues, including factors related 
to gender relations in society. The relationship between 
these different factors and sexual violence has not been 
proven scientifically, but the point here is that the mono-
causal explanation of sexual violence as stemming directly 
from the conflict is too narrow.
1.3 Gender in DRC 
There are some recent reports on gender in DRC, but 
these usually rely on data that is several years old, 
sometimes dating back to 2006 (see Sida, 2009; Ministry 
of Gender, 2011). Although women have an important 
role as food providers in the family, they still have a low 
position in the political, social and economic sphere 
of DRC. The situation has deteriorated in the last two 
decades due to the war and the resulting displacement 
and gender-based violence. 
DRC set up a first gender secretariat under Mobutu Sese 
Seko in the early 1980s, and ratified the Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women in 1985. DRC adopted several additional African 
and UN resolutions relating to women’s rights, including 
the influential UNSCR 1325. The broad international 
attention to sexual violence resulted in a law on sexual 
violence in 2006, even before the ratification of the new 
constitution of the DRC. Even though gender equality 
before the law is guaranteed in the constitution, many 
pieces of national law are pending for revision, including 
the family law that contains a number of clauses that turn 
women into second-rate citizens who, for example, can 
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only obtain property with the permission of their husband. 
In 2009, a national strategy to combat sexual and gender-
based violence was adopted taking into account a broad 
conception of violence, including violation of rights to 
inheritance and other issues. 
Women’s political representation has been marginal 
until recently. It is now a major point of attention 
of international and national NGO programmes to 
encourage and train women for political positions. 
In 2012, the senate adopted a policy which calls for 
a minimum of 30% representation of women in all 
institutions.7 In a cabinet reshuffle in South Kivu in 2013, 
seven women ministers were appointed, the most ever, 
and three female generals were appointed in the Armed 
Forces the same year.
Despite the equality of men and women before the law, 
many domains of life, including marriage, continue to 
be dominated by customary practice. The low level of 
women’s education makes them more vulnerable to 
external life shocks. The costs of education are inhibitive 
and most families cannot afford to send all their children 
to school. They usually prioritise boys’ education, guided 
by a gender expectation that grown-up women will be 
confined to the house and the fields. Strong disparities 
exist between women and men in the economic domain, 
expressed particularly in the control of and access to 
resources. Men formally own all the resources of the 
household. The National Gender Report of 2011 (p.95) 
provides statistical evidence of the lower level of women’s 
revenue compared to men. More than half of all small 
and informal activities are performed by women. The 
level of control women have over their revenue differs 
between urban and rural areas. According to the same 
report (p.35), urban women principally take decisions 
themselves about the use of their income, whereas in 
rural areas these decisions are taken by the men. It has 
to be noted that there must be regional differences with 
regard to the position of women among different ethnic 
groups, yet gender relations in the country continue 
to be under-researched. As in many other African 
countries, Congolese women in rural areas are in charge 
of agricultural activities. Women also find employment 
in the mining areas. The importance of mining for the 
livelihoods of women is poorly understood, yet appears to 
be significant (Bashwira et al., 2013).
7 The bill was passed by the Senate on 7 November 2012, but it is 
not yet enacted because the Supreme Court of Justice had found the law 
unconstitutional as it goes against gender equality.
The DRC has a high rate of early marriage of girls between 
the age of 15 and 19 years, mostly in rural areas, despite 
the legal age of marriage being 18. This gap between the 
gender norms laid down in the 2006 law and subsequent 
policies and the social norms regarding gender, especially 
with regard to the age of marriage, raises much confusion, 
especially among young people. Furthermore, unmarried 
women do not have the same status as married women, 
and the same accounts for women without children. Lack 
of children is also a legitimate cause for divorce, or for 
taking a second or a third wife in many ethnic groups in 
the DRC. While the law defines men forcing their spouses 
to have sex as rape, customary norms dictate that as 
part of the ‘social contract’ between spouses, where 
the man is expected to provide for the family, married 
women must always be available to their husbands. 
The ‘right to sex to satisfy needs’ is strongly interrelated 
with conflict-influenced constructs of heterosexual 
masculinity, whereby militarisation of society both alters 
and frustrates male identities (Eriksson-Baaz and Stern, 
2009). The pervasive reality for most women and men 
in DRC is one of dire poverty. Years of conflict and weak 
governance, exacerbated by the prevalence of pests in 
agriculture, have strongly disabled livelihood activities. 
Urban populations have rapidly grown. For many 
women, especially in the urban areas, petit commerce 
(small trade) is not sufficient to feed the family, and 
they supplement their income through diverse forms of 
transactional sex. Transactional sex is a significant reality 
in the milieus of poor neighbourhood, trade, educational 
institutes, workplaces, and even religious institutions.8
There is often an implicit understanding among 
Congolese and international agencies that reduced 
conflict, reduced poverty and changing cultural practices 
(including increased female leadership) will also reduce 
sexual violence. This may not be the case, considering 
that there is no real evidence on such causalities. 
Sexual violence prevails in many contexts that are 
generally peaceful and less poor. Leaving aside the 
causality question, the issues of poverty, gender-based 
violence and cultural practices are high on the agenda of 
Congolese women’s organisations. 
Since the turn of the century, there has been a 
considerable degree of new formation of women’s 
groups in rural areas and women’s NGOs in the cities 
of eastern DRC. Today, many of these groups continue 
to work on sexual violence and they have substantially 
8 Ongoing research into this topic is conducted by the Institut Supérieur de 
Développement Rural of Bukavu.
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broadened their agenda to include women’s leadership, 
gender-based violence and women’s rights with regard to 
access to land and inheritance, and women’s economic 
empowerment. Research into the women’s movement in 
South Kivu found that this movement is vocal and active, 
but is hampered by a lack of recognition civil society more 
widely, which is partly related to its complete dependence 
on international funding and support (Hilhorst and 
Baswira, 2014). 
1.4 The security situation and sexual violence 
Since 2011, the factors forging gender-based and sexual 
violence in DRC have not changed much and sexual abuse 
continues to be widespread. While most of the sexual 
violence is inflicted by civilians, it continues to be related 
to insecurity. In particular, North and South Kivu have seen 
several outbreaks of (renewed) conflict, which involved 
sexual violence crimes committed against civilians 
by a number of rebel groups. In North Kivu violence is 
mostly concentrated in the territories of Masisi, Walikale, 
Rutshuru, Beni and parts of Lubero. In 2012, violence 
in Masisi territory (North Kivu), ‘was worse than at any 
time since the 1990s, contributing to the displacement 
of up to half a million people in North Kivu’ (IRIN News, 
2013). Amongst these rebels are various maï-maï militias 
such as the maï-maï Cheka, Nyatura, Raïa Mutomboki, 
Kifuafua, and rebel groups such as the Front de Défense 
du Congo, the Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre 
et Souverain, the Patriotes Résistants Congolais, and the 
Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). 
In addition to this list of rebel formations, the Mouvement 
du 23 Mars (M23) and more recently ADF/Nalu 
insurgencies have affected stability in North Kivu since 
2011 (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). 
The Tutsi-dominated M23 rebellion (a sort of rebirth of 
Laurent Nkunda’s Congrès National pour la Défense du 
Peuple rebellion, 2006-2009) was created with support 
from Rwanda9 when General Bosco Ntaganda (formerly 
military chief of staff under the CNDP) defected from the 
Congolese army in early 2012. The M23 took the city 
of Goma in November 2012 without much resistance, 
where there was heavy sexual violence and widespread 
looting. In early 2013 Ntaganda was arrested (he is now 
in ICC custody) and the M23 became divided, its main 
branch continuing under the leadership of General Sultani 
Makenga. In November 2013 the M23 surrendered, with 
key figures fleeing to Uganda and Rwanda. 
9 Even though Rwanda has firmly denied its involvement in the M23 rebellion, 
the UN Group of Experts and others have published a body of evidence showing 
the Rwandan influence over the M23. 
In that same month, the ADF-Nalu (Allied Democratic 
Forces-Nalu), a Ugandan rebel group10 with most of its 
bases in DRC, launched an insurgency in Beni territory. 
Since then a large number of civilians (including women 
and children) have been massacred, mostly with 
machetes. Mass abductions and rape have also been 
reported. Congo’s armed forces, the Forces Armées de 
la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), and 
the UN peacekeeping mission MONUSCO (Mission des 
Organisations des Nations Unies au Congo) launched 
a joint intervention brigade to push back the ADF-Nalu, 
but it has had mixed success. The ADF-Nalu insurgency 
appears to receive less attention than the troubles 
caused by M23. 
In South Kivu, a voluntary repatriation process for the 
FDLR led by MONUSCO until the end of 2014, combined 
with military actions by the FARDC, have weakened rebel 
groups in Walungu/Mwenga (including Maï Maï Raia 
Mutomboki and Maï Maï Maheshe). However, the Plaine 
de la Ruzizi area (between Bukavu and Uvira) has seen 
conflict between three ethnic groups, involving killings 
and cattle raids.11 Further south towards Baraka-Fizi, 
there have been continued insurgencies caused by 
the Maï Maï Yakutumba as well as the Burundian rebel 
Forces Nationales de Libération that has taken refuge in 
South Kivu.12 
Several respondents note that conflict has increasingly 
become decentralised. Since 2005, many insurgencies 
have withdrawn to rural (remote) areas, and since 
2010 the intensity of fighting appears to have gradually 
diminished. The areas that are stable have become larger, 
although violence continues in the problem-areas and 
may flare up in others. 
1.5 Structure of the report 
The next section of the report elaborates the 
methodology of our research. Section 3 deals with the 
first question of how the understanding and perceptions 
of sexual violence assistance in eastern DRC have 
evolved over the past few years, including a discussion 
on statistics about the prevalence of violence. Section 
10 The ADF is a Ugandan rebel group that has fought the Museveni regime 
since the late 1990s, and is composed of Islamic sects and other opposition 
groups. From 2004 they mostly lost their bases in Western Uganda and took 
refuge in the Beni-area in North Kivu. Since early 2013 they allegedly started new 
recruitment of Ugandan youth and have intensified its military operations. 
11 In June 2014, there has been a major incident whereby over 30 Bafulero 
civilians were killed in the village of Mutarule, for which fears of retaliation are 
widespread.
12 Please refer to Annex 6 for a map showing spheres of influence of rebel 
groups in the Kivus. 
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4 concerns the second question of how practices of 
sexual violence assistance have evolved in eastern 
DRC, looking into emergency assistance, medical 
services, psychosocial and socio-economic programmes 
and capacity development for prevention. Section 5 
elaborates on legal action against sexual violence in 
urban areas of eastern DRC. It details the findings of a 
review of 64 judicial cases concerning sexual violence 
and discusses a number of social effects to the increased 
legal attention to violence. Section 6 concludes the report 
and makes a number of recommendations to improve 
action against sexual violence and services to victims. 
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2.1 Longitudinal approach 
This research follows up research done in 2011. Changes 
in a fragile environment like DRC are often fast and 
highly non-linear, reflecting rapid changes in the political 
environment and changing trends in donor behaviour and 
aid programmes. In this case, we found in 2011 that there 
was much discussion among agency personnel about the 
approaches and effects of sexual violence programmes. 
These discussions, which our report captured, were not 
held in the open yet it seemed to us that change was 
imminent considering the widely held critiques among 
people in the field. For this reason, a review within three 
years of the original research was deemed important.
We set out the research as a panel research, aiming to 
ask the same questions to the same set of people. Given 
the high turnover in the international aid sphere, this was 
often not possible, yet the research did to a large extent 
cover the same organisations (national and international) 
and state authorities. We also interviewed additional and 
new actors, including donor representatives.
We also did research into the legal files of sexual violence 
cases, following up files examined in 2011 and adding new 
files. The original motivation of this part of the research was 
based on concerns raised about justice in initial interviews 
and a case one of the researchers encountered of legal 
injustice during the production of a documentary.13 
An important difference with the 2011 research is that 
we incorporated focus group discussions with people in 
villages and urban environments. The previous research 
focused solely on respondents in and around state and 
aid agencies. At the time, we decided that interviewing a 
limited number of local people would be tokenistic, and did 
not want to add to the large number of visitors interested 
in ‘meeting victims’. This time, a number of focus group 
discussions were organised with community members to 
learn from their experiences with assistance around sexual 
violence, but we did not aim to single out women who had 
been directly targeted by these programmes. There were 
also two focus groups with Congolese politicians from the 
Provincial Assemblies in North and South Kivu.
The research took place in Goma and the locality of 
Bweremana in North Kivu (Masisi Territory), and in 
Bukavu and the territory of Walungu in South Kivu. The 
majority of sexual violence programmes take place in 
13 ‘Justice for Sale’ (2011, IFPRODUCTIONS). 
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these two provinces. In addition, telephone interviews 
were done with donor representatives based in Kinshasa. 
The interviews were held by Nynke Douma and Dorothea 
Hilhorst in May 2014. The legal research was done by 
Jocelyne Matabaro. This took place from the beginning of 
June until mid-July 2014.
2.2 Semi-structured interviews
We conducted 49 semi-structured interviews. The 
questionnaire used for the interviews is included in Annex 
4. A total of 36 interviews were held with representatives 
of organisations responding to sexual violence: 10 with 
UN agencies, 17 with international NGOs, and 9 with 
Congolese NGOs. In addition, 5 interviews were held with 
international donor organisations based in Kinshasa, 
and 8 with Congolese political and administrative actors. 
These include representatives of the national police force 
(PNC), customary authorities, the Divisions of Gender, 
Justice and Social Affairs and the public prosecutor (North 
Kivu) and president of the court of appeal (South Kivu). 
Of the 49 interviews, 9 were with the same person as in 
2011, and an additional 13 interviews were held with the 
same organisation and the same post, which had come to 
be held by a different person. 
The interviews documented the experiences and opinions 
of the interviewees. Basing an analysis on individual 
opinions expressed during interviews presents the 
risk of generalising isolated opinions or making some 
opinions more important than others. To address this 
risk, we have only incorporated those viewpoints that 
were shared by multiple informants, even though we 
often present a single quote expressing the point of view. 
Interviewed persons often stressed that their statements 
were personal and did not reflect the viewpoint of the 
organisation. We therefore do not attribute quotes to 
organisations and have instead used a codification of 
respondents. GOV, UN, CNGO and INGO refer respectively 
to representatives of the government, United Nations 
agencies, Congolese NGOs and International NGOs. F 
and M refers to female and male respondents. To allow 
cross-referencing of quotes, we have numbered the 
respondents of each category. UN-M-3 thus represents 
number 3 of our male UN respondents.
Table 1: Overview of focus group discussions 14
Date Place Participants Description Focus
FG1 20-05 Bukavu 7 Members of provincial parliament Perception on SV, SV response and role 
politicians
FG2 22-05 Izege, Walungu 6 Female community members Experiences with SV and SV response in 
community
FG3 22-05 Izege, Walungu 7 Male community members, including 
the chief of the village
Experiences with SV and SV response in 
community
FG4 23-05 Bukavu 4 Adult female sex workers of nightclubs 
in Bukavu14
Labour conditions of prostitution, 
experiences with (sexual) violence, and 
role of authorities
FG5 23-05 Bukavu 7 5 men and 2 women from one of the 
older neighbourhoods of Bukavu, i.e.  
not extremely poor and not rich 
(participants represented different 
generations, including some students)
Social effects of the attention for sexual 
violence in Bukavu
FG6 28-05 Goma 4 Members of provincial parliament Perception on SV, SV response and role 
politicians
FG7 28-05 Bweremana 8 Female community members Experiences with SV and SV response in 
community
FG8 28-05 Bweremana 5 Male community members Experiences with SV and SV response in 
community
FG9 29-05 Goma 4 Urban poor women,
Members of network of [NGO]
Experiences with SV and transactional 
sex in community
FG10 29-05 Goma 5 Urban poor men, Members of network 
of [NGO]
Experiences with SV, SV response and 
domestic violence in community
14 This focus group was facilitated by the Congolese organisation Réseau de Femmes de Développement et Paix. The women were not previously in touch with the 
NGO, and were requested for the interview by a staff member visiting the clubs for this purpose.
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2.3 Focus group discussions
In addition to the individual interviews, we held 10 focus 
group discussions, comprising 57 respondents. Focus 
groups 2, 3, 7 and 8 were held in areas with a high density 
of NGO programmes and were meant to distil what people 
had absorbed from training and what they identified as 
outcomes and possible problems. The focus groups in 
urban contexts were largely removed from NGO activity. 
Participants in these groups based their opinions on 
sexual violence programming mainly on personal stories 
and/or radio programmes. 
A strength of focus groups is that people can comment 
on each other’s experiences and opinions, but conversely 
there is a risk that participants just repeat what the 
first – more powerful – respondent says in response to 
a question. There may, then, have been more diversity 
in opinion than was reflected in the focus groups. An 
exception was the focus groups with politicians in 
Bukavu, where the opposite seemed to happen: all 
participants strived to have a different opinion from 
previous speakers. Their limitations aside, we were able 
to draw many insights from these groups. We encouraged 
speakers to provide us with concrete examples. When 
different examples were used, we considered this as 
evidence for a broadly shared experience.
2.4 Literature and funding review
Publications from the period 2011 to mid-2014 were 
analysed. This review was done between May and August 
2014 by Léonie Mol, an intern from the University of 
Amsterdam. The literature review incorporated available 
‘grey literature’, policy documents and reports of NGOs, as 
well as websites of aid providers. Around 45 documents 
have been analysed, and a similar number of websites. The 
literature review questionnaire can be found in Annex 4. 
In addition, funds available for sexual violence were also 
reviewed. This built upon the previous review of 2011, 
and was done on the basis of websites and information 
from interviews. 
2.5 Legal analysis
The legal analysis consisted of the examination of 
court files on sexual violence. Annex 4 provides the 
list of questions of the examination. The legal analysis 
consisted of two parts.
Firstly, the research followed up 18 cases examined in 
2011. These concern cases that resulted in conviction 
(there were 19 convictions in total, but one file had 
disappeared). They were analysed to assess how the 
implementation of judgements and respect of procedures 
was assured. 
Secondly, the research analysed 46 legal cases on sexual 
violence that were introduced between 2012 and 2013. 
All cases concerned rape, with the exception of one case 
of attempted rape and one case dealing with indecent 
behaviour. We examined those cases of which the file 
was physically present in the office and complete. There 
are many more cases listed than files are available for. In 
addition, there are many cases where the files are empty 
or have too little information to allow analysis. The cases 
were taken from five judicial sections in the province of 
South Kivu, as below. As our researcher was not allowed 
access to files held by the prosecutor’s office (pre-
judicial phase) we cannot make claims about factors that 
influence whether cases qualify for prosecution or not. 
 ■ The High Tribunal in Bukavu, 8 cases
 ■ The Court of Appeal, 10 cases15
 ■ A decentralised tribunal in Kavumu,16 8 cases
 ■ The Military Tribunal in Bukavu, 11 cases
 ■ The Military Court, 9 cases 
The analysis provided a description of the case, including 
the age of the victim and defendant, the relation between 
both parties, the type of charge, the involvement of 
pregnancy, the length of treatment (time), the type 
of hearing, the conclusion of the case and penalties 
involved. The type of hearing refers to the question 
whether the case was dealt with in a mobile court of in 
the ‘normal’ court proceedings. The data in the files were 
further analysed on the following issues:
 ■ Differences in proceeding between civil and military 
courts
 ■ The status of the defendant
 ■ Evidence presented or lacking in the files 
 ■ Legal arguments underpinning the court’s conclusion
 ■ Penalty applied in convictions
 ■ Impressions of the quality of legal proceedings of the 
studied cases.
15 The file of the cases from the Court for Appeal included documents of both 
the 1st and 2nd degree. 
16 The tribunal in Kavumu is operating under the High Tribunal of Uvira.
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There were some difficulties during the legal analysis. 
Some legal personnel were suspicious when the 
investigating lawyer requested insight into cases. The 
legal team was sent away empty-handed several times 
before being granted access. In addition, a massive 
prison break occurred in Bukavu during the period of 
research, when 300 inmates escaped. In the weeks 
following the event, judicial authorities refused to grant 
visitors or researchers access to the prison and the files 
of the inmates. As a consequence it was not possible to 
access all the 2011 files that had led to a conviction. 
2.6 Expert group
The research was accompanied by four Congolese 
experts, who have been involved in an inception meeting 
prior to the fieldwork and have provided comments on the 
draft report. These experts are:
 ■ Professor Murhega Mashanda of the Institut 
Supérieur de Développement Rural
 ■ Venantie Bisimwa Nabintu, Secrétaire exécutive du 
RFDP
 ■ Mme Claudine Tsongo, Coordinatrice de la Dynamique 
des Femmes Juristes (DFJ)
 ■ Mathilde Muhindo Mwamini, former Director of the 
Centre Olame
2.7 Data analysis for reporting
For the analysis of the interview data, use was made 
of the software for qualitative research N-vivo. We 
predefined a number of keywords that helped to 
categorise the interview transcripts. During the process, 
the two main researchers validated each other’s 
categorisations and discussed the results on a daily 
basis. This resulted in keywords being added or altered as 
part of the analysis process. 
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This section focuses on the way responding actors 
approach the problem of sexual violence and how the 
commitment to the issue has evolved since 2011. The 
section starts with an overview of the type of actors 
responding to sexual violence, including the Congolese 
government, international actors and Congolese NGOs 
and women groups. We then focus on the changing 
discourses and approaches to sexual violence. This 
is based on a review of selected agency websites and 
information from the interviewees and their comments 
and observations on prevailing approaches. Section 3.3 
deals with the question of how responding actors find and 
deal with evidence on the prevalence of sexual violence. 
Section 3.4 maps and analyses the funding available for 
sexual violence (in as much as this is possible, considering 
that there is no central recording system of funds). 
3.1 Actors responding to sexual violence 
The attention to sexual violence started around the 
turn of this century, with a number of Congolese 
women’s organisations in local communities and in the 
provincial capitals of North and South Kivu. Since then, 
the response to sexual violence has come to involve 
hundreds of institutional actors, including community-
based organisations, Congolese NGOs, international 
NGOs, Congolese government agencies, and international 
donors. There is no overall registration of organisations 
working on the subject.
The leading policy is Congo’s governmental national 
strategy against sexual violence (Ministry of Gender, 
2009). The National Strategy is operationalised under the 
programme. This government programme for stabilising 
eastern DRC is focusing on three domains – security, 
humanitarian and social assistance, and economic 
development – and is divided into five pillars of which 
fighting sexual violence is one. The Stabilisation Strategy 
for Eastern Congo (STAREC) is supported under the 
international support strategy (ISSSS, phase 1 2008-
2012, phase 2 2013-2017). The pillar on combating 
sexual violence consists of five components or working 
groups. These are considered to be interdependent, and 
should be approached in a multi-sectoral and holistic 
way. Originally, the pillars were chaired by different UN 
agencies, but the trend now is to make government 
agencies the primary coordinators of the pillars.
The five components are: fight against impunity, 
coordinated by the Ministry of Justice and the joint human 
rights office of MONUSCO; multi-sectoral assistance, 
coordinated by the Ministry of Health and UNICEF; 
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protection and prevention, coordinated by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and UNHCR; data and mapping, coordinated 
by the Ministry of Gender and UNFPA; and security sector 
reform, coordinated by the Ministry of Defence and 
MONUSCO-Security Sector Reform, although this one is not 
functioning in practice.17 The components are coordinated 
by the MONUSCO Sexual Violence in Conflict Unit (‘in 
conflict’ was recently added to the name to emphasise that 
MONUSCO only has a mandate for conflict). 
The responsibility for overall coordination from the side of 
the national government lies with the Ministry of Gender, 
Family and Children and its technical branches of the 
Divisions of Gender in the provinces. At the provincial level, 
there also is a Ministry of Gender, Family and Children, 
which is coordinated by the provincial government and is 
seen as the political authority. In practice, the provincial 
ministry usually uses the division office of the national 
ministry to implement programmes in the province. The 
Division of Gender, Family and Children coordinates a 
number of programmes. Significantly, the government 
budget for the Ministry in the provinces is small, and 
allocated funds are not actually disbursed, making the 
Division to a large extent dependent on UN organisations 
and international donors.18 Implementation often involves 
partnerships with local NGOs. For the Division, the 2006 
Law on Sexual Violence is a leading policy framework, 
as well as UN resolution 1325, and the 2009 national 
strategy on sexual violence. 
The ministry has formed two provincial coordination 
mechanisms in 2012, one dealing with sexual violence 
(complementing the STAREC mechanism) and one on the 
implementation of SC resolution 1325. This leads to some 
confusing duplication in the eyes of local actors.19 
There are numerous INGOs and NGOs working on the 
topic of sexual violence. After the war formally ended 
in 2002, and especially after the establishment of a 
large humanitarian pooled fund, most NGOs started to 
incorporate sexual violence responses in their activities, 
and many local NGOs were formed with a special mandate 
on sexual violence, often in order to profit from the 
availability of funding.
To give an indication of numbers of local organisations 
in South Kivu: the Women’s Component of the Bureau of 
Civil Society has 93 member organisations. Among the 
17  Interview UN-M-1 (19 May 2014). 
18  Interview GOV-F-3 (22 November 2013).
19  Interview CNGO-F-2 (20 May 2014). 
member organisations of the Composante Femme, three 
are considered platforms in themselves: the Caucus de 
Femmes, the Cadre permanent de Concertation de la 
Femme Congolaise (63 members) and the Conseil des 
Organisations de Femmes Agissant en Synergie (44 
members) (Hilhorst and Baswira, 2014: 29). Most of these 
agencies continue to have a (partial) mandate on sexual 
violence response. With reduced funding in recent years 
(see below), many Congolese members of the Women’s 
Component have become non-functional (39). It is 
estimated that as much as two-thirds of the membership 
has no funding, and has shrunk to two or three women 
who keep the organisation formally alive. In Walungu, the 
reduction in NGO activity was also visible, with many fading 
placards indicating women’s organisations previously 
working on sexual violence. Many of the small NGOs 
concerned with community-based work had no funding left. 
The director of the hospital in Walungu territory observed: 
‘There was a time when there was a big boom of NGOs 
all working on these issues. That was more or less from 
2009 to 2012. Now, I increasingly see organisations that 
tell me that they do not have funding anymore.’ While the 
numbers of local NGOs working on sexual violence has 
thus not decreased, the volume of their activities has gone 
down. This is part of a wider trend of reduced funding for 
Congolese NGOs.
There continue to be many local women’s associations in 
the different territories of eastern DRC. These associations 
do not depend on funding as such, as their membership is 
local and voluntary, but the level of their activities will go up 
and down with opportunities and activities organised by (I)
NGOs. The women’s associations are often connected to 
multiple NGOs as a local ‘antenna’ to follow-up on cases of 
sexual violence and other forms of gender-based violence.
3.2 Trends in coordination
For a long time, sexual violence working groups co-existed 
in parallel with the Comité Provincial de la Lutte Contre les 
Violences Sexuelles (CPLVS), a provincial body presided 
over by the Ministry of Gender. The Ministry of Gender now 
seems to take greater ownership in guiding coordination, 
and aims to align the two coordination structures. We also 
found state agents more motivated to take part in these 
structures, despite their low salaries, as one of them 
mentioned: ‘Sometimes I use my own money to pay for 
transport to get to coordination meetings because I have 
to save the image of our state’.20 
20  Interview GOV-M-2 (21 May 2014). 
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Also, several respondents commented very positively 
about the improved coordination for medical assistance, 
where the Ministry of Health is a strong partner. In this 
group, evaluations on approaches to sexual violence 
have for example been done and shared with relevant 
actors. Legal assistance was also said to improve, with 
the initiation of two taskforces (one on civil justice, one on 
military justice). Here also an increased collaboration with 
and ownership by legal authorities is noticed. 
There is a gap in the collaboration and coordination 
with political actors at the provincial level. Each of 
the provinces has a parliament, but those involved 
in action against sexual violence rarely involve the 
parliamentarians and make little use of their influence 
and knowledge. The parliamentarians often know a lot 
about what happens in their constituency areas. In both 
focus groups held with parliamentarians they said they 
hardly interact with NGOs. As one deputy said: ‘They 
only come to look for us to present their results, but we 
need to be involved in the identification from the start of 
programmes. There is insufficient dialogue.’21 The lack 
of dialogue between the parliament and NGOs evolved 
during the period of data gathering, and we did not ask 
NGO representatives explicitly about this theme. On the 
other hand, we can confirm that the respondents from the 
agencies never referred spontaneously to parliament as 
a source of information or a centre of power that could be 
drawn upon to engender change.
The interviews did suggest that collaboration between 
programmes has been strengthened in recent years. The 
complementarity of actions and referral of victims has 
improved. In 2011, a highly competitive field was found 
where competition even existed over victims to enlist 
in programmes. The working groups for coordination, 
where discussions on aid effectiveness are increasingly 
being held, seem to have made a difference. Improved 
coordination does raise a question of how the privacy of 
victims can be protected. The sharing of data is important 
to avoid duplication of assistance but may jeopardise 
privacy issues. Médécins sans Frontières raised this 
issue, especially in relation to MONUSCO, as it feared 
that revealing the identity of victims could be abused in 
security operations.22 The organisation does not share 
data about patients.
21  Focus Group-1, deputies Provincial Parliament South Kivu (20 May 2014). 
22  Interview INGO-F-2/INGO-M-3 (29 May 2014). 
3.3 Prevalence of sexual violence
This section deals with the efforts to estimate the 
level of sexual violence in DRC. We first capture some 
of the trends and concerns up to 2011, then discuss 
the Luvungi case as an illustration of the difficulties in 
assessing the number of victims in cases of mass rape, 
and then discuss some recent trends. 
3.3.1 Trends until 2011
In the period prior to 2011, responding actors made a 
lot of effort to try to estimate the prevalence of sexual 
violence in DRC. We found vastly varying figures in 
different sources.23 Most sources assumed that their 
estimates were conservative because women would be 
reluctant to speak out about sexual violence. However, 
we found there were also many reasons why estimates 
could be exaggerated. It is important to reiterate these, 
because many of the older data and reports are still cited 
as authoritative sources. 
Over-reporting of sexual violence cases happened 
through different mechanisms, including:
 ■ extrapolation of data from hotspots to large 
geographical areas
 ■ aggregation of data based on partially overlapping 
datasets of aid agencies dealing with the same cases
 ■ false reports, where women looking for services 
because of poverty or medical problems could only 
find programmes for sexually violated women
 ■ other perverse incentives in the aid system, such as 
local representatives (antennas) being encouraged to 
report as many cases as possible. 
There were thus many contradictions and shortcomings 
in data collection, analysis and interpretation, leading 
to contentious figures. The problem was exacerbated by 
the fact that the international media reduced nuanced 
discussion of data to crude headlines such as ’48 women 
raped per hour’ (Peterman et al., 2011), reinforcing an 
image of DRC as the ‘rape capital of the world’.24 Our 
report concluded that statistics should be used with the 
utmost care, and always complemented by qualitative 
and contextualised information. 
23  See also Pratt and Werchick (2004), who already noted problems with data 
gathering. 
24  This phrase was used by UN’s special representative on sexual violence, 
Margareth Wallstrom. 
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3.3.2 Mass rape: the case of Luvungi
One of the most controversial issues concerns the figures 
about mass rape. There have been several instances 
where rebel attacks resulted in rape cases and media 
and agencies started circulating high estimates of the 
number of women involved. One such instance concerned 
a rebel invasion of the village of Luvungi in North Kivu 
in August 2010, where a large number of women were 
reportedly mass-raped (Heaton, 2013; Global Post, 
2014b; New York Times, 2010; Cordaid, 2014a). 
Initial reports about the Luvungi mass rape were aired 
by International Medical Corps (IMC), an international 
medical NGO working in the area. Numerous reports and 
investigations followed and the number of victims cited 
varied greatly and tended to be inflated with time: from 
37 to 242 and then up to 387. The international media 
picked up on the story and questions were raised about 
why the nearby MONUSCO contingent did not intervene, 
casting doubt on the effectiveness of the UN. Immediately 
after the mass rape, however, stories abounded in DRC 
of how the numbers of affected women were inflated 
(Hilhorst, 2010). Three years later, in 2013, Foreign Policy 
journalist Laura Heaton investigated the issue (Heaton, 
2013). 
Heaton spoke with a large number of villagers in Luvungi 
and other relevant stakeholders and concluded that the 
figures were overblown. The high number of rapes was 
inconsistent with the UN investigation on the day after 
the attack: the (classified) report makes no mention of 
rape, but mentions other issues such as burned houses. 
Heaton, who has previous experience of interviewing 
rape survivors, found that the Luvungi women’s accounts 
came across as rehearsed. A local doctor said he had, 
during that period, treated six women for rape, and two 
of these rapes were committed by civilians. One way 
in which the figure came to be bloated was because 
everyone who accessed the free medical aid that became 
available after the attack was listed as ‘raped’. 
There are different explanations for what happened. One 
is that aid agencies distorted figures for the purpose of 
raising funds; another is that the local staff reported on 
rape at the request of their headquarters because funds 
were not earmarked for other medical problems. Yet 
another explanation came from a woman from the village: 
‘After the rebels left the village, elders decided that the 
community would say that many women had been raped 
to avoid ostracising those who were.’ It was for the sake of 
community cohesion, she said. Once aid groups came it 
was important to protect this story so that everyone could 
benefit from assistance. 
While rape did happen during the 2010 attack of Luvungi, 
the episode is now taken as an example of how distorted 
reports can become if they are not done with care, detail 
and transparency. 
3.3.3 Current trends
In the past few years, efforts have been made to better 
harmonise and streamline available data. Under the 
cluster-working group approach of the UN system, a 
specific working group on data gathering and analysis 
was initiated in 2012, spearheaded by UNFPA in 
collaboration with the Ministry of Gender and other 
partners. The principle is that every victim gets coded to 
avoid duplications.25 The working group has, however, 
suffered since funding dwindled after 2012. In early 2014 
some new funding prospects came from the Belgian 
government ($5 million), but only for North Kivu and 
Province Orientale. It is estimated that approximately 70% 
of the actors active in the field of sexual violence share 
their data with the data analysis working group. 
Among the agencies that do not share their data are 
Médécins sans Frontières and the American Bar 
Association. They cite reasons of patient confidentiality 
and humanitarian principles.
There are several other reporting systems but it isn’t clear 
whether or how they relate to the data analysis of the 
working group. The Ministry of Health collects medical 
data on sexual violence victims from health clinics. Police 
records are not included in the database either. This 
brings about bias in the data of the working group with 
regard to young victims: under-18-year-olds constitute a 
large share of police cases but are much less represented 
in the working group’s data.
Reports do not show strong changes in the number of 
cases of sexual violence. The Panzi hospital in South Kivu 
included in its 2013 annual report 10-year figures on its 
sexual violence programme (excluding mobile clinics). It 
shows that between 2004 and 2010 figures fluctuated 
between 1,900 and 2,500 cases per year. While they 
dipped in the years 2011 and 2012 to 1,172, in 2013 
they went up again to 1,772. The Ministry of Gender 
in North Kivu has reported 4,689 incidents in 2011, 
25  Interview GOV-M-5 (26 May 2014). 
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6,931 in 2012 and 4,925 in 2013. The 2012 increase is 
probably related to the M23 insurgency. 
The problems with data gathering, and the prevalence 
of multiple systems, render it impossible to give a total 
estimate of the numbers of sexual violence in North and 
South Kivu. The table below presents the data on North 
and South Kivu by data analysis working group (UNFPA, 
Ministry of Gender). They represent the number of cases 
that have been reported in the year 2013, including 
cases that happened in the past and were only reported 
on this year. 
Table 2: Reported sexual violence cases in 2013 for 
North and South Kivu
South Kivu - 
Territory/location
Total reported  
cases
Of which new 
incidents
Bukavu 2,510 1,302
Fizi 846 589
Idwji 116 65
Kabare 531 302
Kalehe 1,564 1,253
Shabunda 801 592
Mwenga 1,869 1,263
Uvira 1,488 785
Walungu 981 463
Total 10,706 6,614
North Kivu – 
Territory/location
Goma 814 814
Nyiragongo 473 473
Rutshuru 1,794 1,529
Beni 857 764
Lubero 1,237 1,035
Masisi 1,492 1,086
Walikale 231 231
Total 6,898 5,932
There are some qualifications to make about these data, 
illustrating the difficulties involved.
 ■ Why the percentage of old cases in South Kivu 
(38%) is much higher than for North Kivu (14%) is not 
explained.
 ■ Approximately half of the new cases in South Kivu 
are derived from 2013 figures reported by the Panzi 
hospital.26 The latter database, however, does not 
distinguish old cases from new.
 ■ The UNFPA report states that 98-99.7% of the 
recorded victims are female, which may indicate 
underreporting of male victims, especially in the 
conflict zones. 
 ■ The report specifies the types of sexual violence. 
While in South Kivu 97% of the cases concern rape, 
North Kivu figures also include sexual aggression 
(10.2%), sexual harassment (3.1%), physical assault 
(1.8%) and forced marriage (1.8%), with the remaining 
82% representing rape cases.
 ■ Interestingly, the suspect profile in the report states 
that in South Kivu 71% of the cases are committed 
by armed groups, against 32% in North Kivu, with a 
further 13.5% of the cases committed by the army 
or police (7.3% in North Kivu). These outcomes are 
surprising, because most violence in 2013 was 
concentrated in North Kivu, and because of the 
general understanding that today the majority of 
cases are of civilian origin. It is unclear how these 
percentages relate to ‘old’ and ‘new’ cases reported.  
Although the routine collection of data has become 
more streamlined in the past few years, questions can 
still be raised about the accuracy of the data. It seems 
that the urge to prove the extent of sexual violence that 
characterised the years prior to 2011 has diminished. 
None of the respondents made reference to new 
initiatives of large-scale or in-depth research on the scale 
of sexual violence. 
3.4 Changing views and approaches
In this section we look at views and approaches to sexual 
violence at different levels. We start with a review of 
recent international policies, then how international 
agencies active in the field present their views, and finally 
how approaches in DRC are changing on the ground.
3.4.1 International policy attention to sexual violence
Sexual violence in conflict-affected areas continues to be 
on international policy agendas as an issue that concerns 
human rights as well as international security. 
26 Interview, UN-M-1 (19 May 2014).
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In April 2013, the G8 foreign ministers adopted the 
Declaration on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict, 
stating that (Foreign and Common Wealth Office, 2013):
Sexual violence in armed conflict represents one 
of the most serious forms of violation or abuse of 
international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law. Preventing sexual violence 
in armed conflict is therefore both a matter of 
upholding universal human rights and of maintaining 
international security, in keeping with UN Security 
Council Resolution 1820. Ministers emphasised that 
more must be done to address these ongoing crimes, 
including by challenging the myths that sexual 
violence in armed conflict is a cultural phenomenon 
or an inevitable consequence of war or a lesser crime.
In 2013, the Security Council adopted the Women Peace 
and Security resolution, highlighting the nexus between 
rape and the politics of war, and emphasising the fight 
against impunity. Resolution 2106 reads (UN Security 
Council, 2013: 2): 
The Security Council … notes that sexual violence can 
constitute a crime against humanity or a constitutive 
act with respect to genocide; further recalls that rape 
and other forms of serious sexual violence in armed 
conflict are war crimes; calls upon Member States to 
comply with their relevant obligations to continue to 
fight impunity by investigating and prosecuting those 
subject to their jurisdiction who are responsible for 
such crimes.
There is a first international case on sexual violence. 
Rebel leader Bosco Ntaganda has been in the custody 
of the ICC since March 2013. Among the 13 counts of 
war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity 
against him, the trial seems to focus its attention on 
sexual violence. The trial is significant according to the 
Director of the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice 
because ‘for the first time in international criminal law, 
the ICC has charged a senior military figure with acts of 
rape and sexual slavery committed against child soldiers 
within his own militia group and under his command’ (ICC 
Women, 2014).
In June 2014, the Summit to End Sexual Violence in 
Conflict was held in London. The summit was a joint 
initiative of the British Foreign Secretary William Hague 
and the Special Envoy for the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Angelina Jolie. It was part of the Preventing 
Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative launched by the UK 
government in 2012. The summit was attended by 1,700 
delegates from 123 countries and aimed to develop 
action to tackle impunity for the use of rape as a weapon 
of war and to begin to change global attitudes to these 
crimes. The summit is evidence of the attention being 
given to sexual violence in war, yet it was also criticised for 
a lack of follow-up. According to an article in The Guardian 
the initiative has had negligible impact while British 
funding for the issue has been diminished rather than 
increased (The Guardian, 2015).
3.4.2 Sexual violence and gender approaches of 
International NGOs
Conflict-related sexual violence figures on all the websites 
of INGOs working in DRC that were consulted for this 
research. Action against sexual violence is an important 
element in the story of why aid agencies are active in the 
country. 
Websites usually describe sexual violence in general 
terms, for example: ‘Advocates on the ground estimate 
that over half a million women and girls have been raped 
since the conflict began’.27 Some explicitly say that sexual 
violence by civilians is now more common than rape by 
military actors, which is seen as a spin-off from the war. 
Without time-markers, locations, source references or 
trend analysis, such general statements make the story 
of sexual violence oddly disembedded. We do not get 
to know where in DRC the problems are worse, what 
patterns exist in the types of crime and assailants, or 
how the current situation has evolved. Women’s personal 
testimonies are often undated. There is no assessment of 
how past interventions have resulted in improvements in 
the situation or why the problem is so persistent despite 
years of intervention. 
Websites differ in the space they give to explaining sexual 
violence. Several additional factors are explained as 
aggravating the effects of conflict on sexual violence. 
Gender relations and impunity are often cited as an 
underlying factor. The Enough Project, for example, 
states: ‘SGBV [Sexual and Gender-Based Violence] in 
Congo is a practice entrenched by widespread impunity 
and gender inequality norms’. It emphasises the link 
between SGBV, conflict and mineral wealth. ‘Ending and 
preventing sexual violence in eastern Congo will require 
political and financial commitments to reforming Congo’s 
27 V-Day city of joy website: http://drc.vday.org/about-city-of-joy/
congo/#sthash.LK8DCbV4.dpuf
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security, justice, and economic institutions.’28 This quote 
also brings up a second explanation, which is related to 
the government. This explanation varies from attention 
for sexual crimes committed by government agents such 
as military or the police, to a lack of robust action against 
impunity. Thirdly, some websites mention poverty as an 
underlying factor, explaining that poverty makes women 
more vulnerable to sexual violence. 
The lack of specific analysis on sexual violence means the 
relation between programmes and the problem of sexual 
violence are equally unspecific. Against a generalised 
background of sexual violence, every programme directed 
at any women becomes without question part of the 
action against sexual violence. It forfeits questions such 
as what the most effective approach would be, what the 
priority needs are, and who the most urgent target groups 
are. Importantly, there are no geographical markers that 
ensure that programmes are implemented in those areas 
where sexual violence is most common.
The most common answer to sexual violence is 
empowering women. Websites combine two opposite 
discourses on women: the victim who is always vulnerable 
to rape and the strong leader of the nation. An example of 
the quotes that point at women’s strengths: ‘Women are 
crucial contributors to their societies. They are the ones 
who cross ethnic and religious borders and who see to 
the healthy development of their children. They are the 
ones to advocate for education, employment and new 
opportunities for young people’ (Cordaid, 2014b).29 When 
women’s economic, political and social empowerment 
becomes the ultimate answer to sexual violence, every 
programme strengthening women’s position becomes 
some form of action against sexual violence. This can 
result in the neglect of other factors that may lead to 
change, such as the reform of the security forces or the 
improvement of governance.
There are few websites that recognise the problem of 
sexual violence against men, albeit in passing, such as in 
the following quote: ‘for the past 15 years, thousands of 
women, children and even men have been subjected to 
sexual violence’ (italics added) (Merlin, 2011). No question 
marks are placed with the low percentage of male victims 
in official statistics. Men are in some cases part of the 
target group of sexual violence programmes, but as part of 
28 See Enough Project website: www.enoughproject.org/conflicts/eastern_
congo/sexual-violence. 
29 Also see Cordaid webite: www.cordaid.org/en/topics/womens-leadership/
about-topic. 
the projected solutions: ‘…to tackle the culture of impunity 
that allows perpetrators of rape to roam freely, Women 
for Women International believes that we need to engage 
men in the dialogue about women’s rights and value to 
society’ (Women for Women, 2012: 2).
3.4.3 Changing approaches to sexual violence
In 2011, the dominant approach to sexual violence was a 
holistic or multi-sector approach. This meant combining 
medical, psycho-social, economic, and judicial assistance 
to survivors of sexual violence (Pratt and Werchick, 
2004: 6). We found that in practice this approach was 
not effectively implemented. Responses were often 
disjointed and uneven, with a high level of medical 
support but less psycho-social and economic support, 
and with only small proportion of women receiving legal 
assistance. 
We also noted that the assistance was highly victim-
oriented, with a strong emphasis on direct service delivery 
to victims, rather than strengthening institutions that can 
respond to sexual violence. A representative of a peace-
building organisation said: ‘I see the issue of sexual 
violence as colonised by humanitarian organisations. It is 
almost treated equal as women need shelter, and other 
needs, instead of looking at the situation in general’.30
We found several changes in approaches to sexual 
violence in our recent research. The issue of disjointed 
services for sexually violated women has led to several 
initiatives. On the one hand, there is a trend to make 
services more integrated through, among other things, 
more recognition of organisational specialisation and 
better referral between different organisations. On the 
other hand, there is a trend to develop parallel service 
delivery with specialised agencies offering all forms 
of assistance for sexual violence victims in one place. 
Panzi hospital in Bukavu has, for example, constructed a 
large building where 160 women can live temporarily to 
receive integrated care, including facilities to rebuild their 
livelihoods. At the time of our fieldwork, the World Bank 
was preparing a large programme (around $55 million) 
based on a one-stop approach, where victims can go to 
one centre to receive all types of assistance.
Striking changes were found in how responses to sexual 
violence are embedded in broader programming. An 
international coordinator of gender summarised the 
30 Interview INGO-F-5 (28 May 2014). 
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changes as: ‘we now see a change of focus towards 
longer-term causes, and a focus on gender-inequality 
more broadly.’31 
For example, in the health sector, sexual violence 
responses are increasingly integrated in programmes 
on maternal health or reproductive health care. This 
approach aims to equip the normal health facilities to deal 
with sexual violence better in order to reduce dependency 
on specialised hospitals: ‘In South Kivu, people come 
to Panzi from very far. Panzi then organises mobile 
clinics and then people wait for days along the road 
until the clinic will arrive, instead of going to local health 
structures.’32 The policy to strengthen general health 
services can, however, also mean that the attention to 
sexual violence becomes de-centred to the extent that 
it is not clear if and how it is addressed at all. We found, 
for example, a case where a general primary health care 
programme was framed as action against sexual violence 
following the rationale that women who are healthy are 
less vulnerable and so less likely to be attacked.
We also observed a trend where responses to sexual 
violence are embedded in broader approaches to gender. 
As one donor representative said: 
More people are seeing the need to connect action 
against sexual violence to a much broader gender 
agenda. Internationally, rape as a weapon of war 
still continues to be the dominant discourse despite 
the limited evidence of it being a conscious military 
strategy.33 
UN agencies such as the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and international NGOs such as 
IMA World Health point to the multi-dimensionality of 
gender issues, and local NGOs have come to define their 
programmes in more general terms of gender-based 
violence. As one NGO stated: ‘we are still being pulled 
into sexual violence by donors, but we want to travel 
away from this, as our mandate is much broader and 
we want to focus on all rights of women’.34 Many NGOs 
make reference to other types of gender-based violence 
including access to land and inheritance issues. Even 
MONUSCO is in the process of broadening its mandate, 
which was restricted to conflict-related sexual violence, to 
31 Interview UN-M-1 (19 May 2014).
32 Interview UN-M-1 (19 May 2014). 
33 Interview DO-F-3 (27 May 2014).
34 Interview CNGO-F-2/CNGO-M-3/CNGO-M-4 (20 May 2014). 
focus more broadly on gender-based violence.35 UNHCR 
in Goma also said that it now focuses on gender issues 
more broadly, including social norms and family values.
The broadening of programmes to gender-based violence 
more generally is a response to data that show that sexual 
violence is more often committed by civilians than armed 
groups. Respondents also argue civilian cases outnumber 
military cases.36 Some respondents still attribute this to 
conflict, noting that these sexual violence crimes are an 
indirect consequence of conflict.37 Eight respondents 
specifically cited poverty and unemployment as one of 
the causes contributing to sexual violence committed 
by civilians, referring to the general economic malaise 
observed in DRC and how a lack of prospects drives 
people to develop delinquent behaviour. 17 respondents 
emphasised the need to analyse sexual violence in 
a broader sense, paying much more attention to the 
position of women in general, as well as prostitution/
transactional sex, and domestic violence (in its various 
forms, including sexual violence). Cultural factors were 
considered by many respondents as among the root 
causes of violence. During one of the focus groups in 
Goma, a man living in an urban poor neighbourhood said:
Imagine, since I was little I have seen my father 
hitting my mother so bad that she started bleeding 
from her nose and mouth. What would I become 
with such an example? Some youth from our 
neighbourhood are now married and become real 
dictators in their homes. They repeat what they 
learned. There is a real need to make youth aware 
that such behaviour is not acceptable.38
A related trend is that most of the agencies we spoke with 
had changed their approach to become more community-
based. Again, this was found throughout the system. 
MONUSCO and UNICEF promote community-based 
approaches among their partners. Large INGOs such 
as the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and IMA 
World Health, as well as local NGOs now tend to favour 
such approaches. Community-based approaches mainly 
concern socio-economic projects. The reasons for shifting 
to community-based approaches are several. When 
services are only made available to violated women, this 
35 Interview UN-M-1 (19 May 2014). 
36 Interview CNGO-M-5/CNGO-M-6/CNGO-M-7 (21 May 2014); Interview 
GOV-F-2 (21 May 2014); Interview INGO-M-6/INGO-M-7/INGO-F-8/INGO-F-9 (28 
May 2014); Interview UN-M-6 (28 May 2014). 
37 CNGO-F-3 (20 May 2014). 
38 Focus group-10 (29 May 2014).
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may stigmatise them in the community and it may also 
invite fake cases.39 There is also the problem of follow-
up when individual women are given a package (usually 
cash) for socio-economic recovery.40 Community-based 
approaches can be coupled to strategies to make the 
government more responsible for the pursuit of cases 
of sexual violence, by strengthening the police or civil 
servants working on gender. 
The broadening of scope in gender programming is also 
seen in programmes that have started in recent years 
and have veered away from sexual violence programming. 
Kvinna till Kvinna, for example, organised scoping visits 
prior to the start of its DRC programme (2009) with the 
initial intention of working on sexual violence.41 According 
to the staff based in DRC, the programme focused 
instead on broader themes such as gender, human rights, 
female leadership and citizenship.42 The organisation’s 
website, however, continues to emphasise sexual 
violence as a driver of the programme. 
The broadening of the scope of sexual violence response 
leads to programming where the direct relation with sexual 
violence becomes remote. Many actors continue to label 
their work as response to sexual violence. A number of 
actors have now redefined their gender programmes away 
from sexual violence. DFID, for example, has abandoned 
using sexual violence as a main frame. It embeds violence 
response in healthcare and multi-sectoral assistance, 
while its gender programme now focuses more broadly 
on young women as an especially vulnerable and largely 
neglected category of women. 
In 2011 we found a number of organisations considering 
involving men in their programmes. Three years later, this 
was still the case, and some respondents considered this a 
significant trend. There was little evidence of a systematic 
involvement of men in programmes on sexual violence, 
apart from training sessions (see next section). In Bukavu, 
a group of ‘V-men’ has emerged around the organisation of 
V-day, whose statement reads (V-Day, 2014): 
We understand that women are our most precious 
resource, pillar of the family, the basic cell of the 
Nation, and backbone of the economy. Today, in the 
twenty-first century, despite their daily struggle, 
39 UN-M-1 (19 May 2014). 
40 INGO-M-9 (29 May 2014). 
41 Based on an unrecorded informal meeting with the scoping team years ago.
42 INGO-F-13/INGO-F-14 (May 2015), interview conducted for another mission 
scoping the need for a gender research centre in South Kivu. 
determination and courage, some customs and 
cultural practices of our retrograde patriarchal 
societies keep them in an inferior status of second-
class citizens and modern slaves.
In Goma, we visited the office of the Congo Men’s Network. 
Created in 2009, it has gained more visibility in recent 
years and several international respondents referred to it. 
The network distances itself from the ‘rape as a weapon 
of war’ discourse and focuses instead on cultural aspects 
and customs as the basis of gender-based violence.43 
Some Congolese church-based agencies are more inclined 
to involve men in their activities but have little connection 
to the organisations specialised in gender-based violence 
(Hilhorst and Bashwira, 2014). 
A final remarkable trend is the absence of any reference 
to conflict-related sexual violence in many interviews. It 
appears that only a few organisations continue to work 
on this issue, while the majority have moved to address 
gender-based violence in geographical areas that are 
currently more peaceful.
3.5 Funding for sexual violence
There is no central database on funding for programmes 
against sexual violence. Data in this section are thus 
compiled from different sources and are not complete, so 
it is difficult to demonstrate a direct link between changes 
in support as addressed in the previous paragraph and 
type of funds made available. The information here is 
mostly illustrative in presenting how earmarked funds for 
sexual violence relate to other thematic funding areas, 
and how funding over the 2012-2013 period compares to 
2010-2011. 
3.5.1 Multi-donor trust funds and sexual violence 
response
Some of the most substantial programmes on sexual 
violence have been funded through the SRFF (SRFF, 2009). 
This Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) operated until its 
closure in mid-2014 with the support of the UN International 
Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS), in line 
with STAREC. Several governments have contributed, such 
as Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, with 
a total pledge of $22.8 million.44 The Pooled Fund, where 
43 CNGO-M-0/CNGO-M-10/CNGO-M-11/CNGO-M12/CNGO-M-13 (26 May 
2014). 
44 Multi Donor Trust Fund Gateway at http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/
CRF00, under ‘projects’ (period selected from January 2009 until December 
2013). 
22 www.securelivelihoods.org
humanitarian funds are brought together, also allocates 
funds to sexual violence response, mainly under the 
Medical Cluster and the Protection Cluster, although the 
figures in the annual reports do not specify the proportion 
of funds under these headings for sexual violence (Pooled 
Fund, 2012: 19; Pooled Fund, 2013: 35). Aside from these, 
some of the other MDTF facilities probably also fund some 
(indirect) sexual-violence related projects and sub-themes. 
Table 3 summarises the expenditure from the MDTFs 
for two 24-month periods: 2010-2011 and 2012-2013. 
The most important change is that the MDTFs have been 
reduced. Overall, it seems support for DRC is reducing. 
There are currently many competing crisis situations and 
some respondents mention donor fatigue exacerbated 
by the lack of commitment to reform by the Congolese 
government.45
Table 3: Multi trust fund modalities for DRC, approved projects between 2010 and 2011 (24 months), as well as 
between 2012 and 2013 (24 months)
MDTF47 Themes, focus Period A: 2010-2011 Period B: 2012-2013 Absolute 
A-BApproved 
$ millions 
% total SRFF-SV 
prop.
Approved 
$ millions
% total SRFF-SV 
prop.
SRFF
2010-2014
Sexual violence 8.14 3.43 1 6.8448 3.6 1 –
Internally Displaced Persons 3.95 1.66 0.5 0.0 na –––
Fighting 
impunity 2013-
2018
Support to legal sector reform, legal 
assistance
5.79 
(2013 
only!)
0.8 +
SSR 
2008-2011
Non-lethal support to FARDC, military 
justice (training and rehabilitation of 
infrastructures), living conditions of military 
personnel (ex. building barracks)
5.33 2.24 0.6 0.25 0.03 –––
Peace building 
2006-2015
Returnees, DDR, police reform and training, 
restoration of state authority (training, 
infrastructure), military justice, prison 
conditions, human rights 
17.94 7.55 2.2 5.0949 0.7 –––
Pooled Fund 
2006-to date
Coordination, early recovery, education, 
food security, health, logistics, refugees, 
nutrition, protection, shelter and non-food 
item, water-sanitation and hygiene
195.42 82.23 n/a 167.96 n/a –
…of which50 Water, sanitation and hygiene 16.83 7.08 2.0 15.09 2.3 –
Education 4.83 2.03 0.6 5.86 0.9 +
Health 10.46 4.40 1.3 14.27 2.1 ++
Food security 11.87 4.99 1.3 19.87 2.9 ++
Nutrition 6.39 2.69 0.8 15.11 2.2 +++
Protection 7.15 3.00 0.9 9.87 1.4 +
MDG 
2007-2013
Economic reintegration of returnees and 
victims of sexual violence, improving basic 
social services 
1.37 0.58 0.2 0.87 0.1 –
UN-REDD 
2008-2015
Deforestation, nature conservation 5.50 2.31 0.7 2.88 0.4 –
UN Action 
against sexual 
violence 2009-
2017
DRC-based projects (mostly studies and 
evaluations)
0.9351 0.1
TOTAL 237.65 100% 189.74
45 UN-M-1 (19 May 2014)
46  MONUSCO-Sexual Violence Unit (2011, internal); Smits and Cruz (2011), 
Multi-Partner Trustfund (webpage), individual donor information. NK=North Kivu; 
SK=South Kivu; IT=Ituri; MN=Maniema. The MDTF for microfinance has been left 
out of the comparison, since it was the only MDTF for which approved budgets 
covered a 12-month period from 2011-2012. This made comparison with the 
other MDTFs difficult.
47 The timeframe is based on years cited MDTF website.
48 Please note that this figures represents the actual expenditure, as it was 
significantly higher than the approved budget of $4.6 million
49 Idem
50 In line with the degree of detail provided by the database on the Multi 
Partner Trustfund website some of the thematic areas of spending of the Pooled 
Fund are clarified here. The remaining (biggest share) of the Pooled Fund budget 
is not thematically labelled and referred to as ‘Pooled Fund’.
51 The total budget of the UN Action against sexual violence funds for 2012-
2013 stood at $9.5 million.
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Spending on responses to sexual violence under the SRFF 
also reduced, but its share remained at the same proportion 
of the total as in the previous years. In the 2011 report 
we argued that spending on areas considered to address 
some of the root causes of sexual violence (conflict, security 
sector reform) was relatively low in comparison to the SRFF 
funds (2010-2011). For the 2012-2013 period this is even 
more the case, as the Security Sector Reform trust fund 
came to an end in late 2011 and the peacebuilding fund 
has been significantly reduced, restricting the capacity 
available to address root causes of sexual violence. Instead, 
a new trust fund on fighting impunity has been created 
(2013-2018), which is likely to include legal support for 
sexual violence, although this is not earmarked as such. 
The proportion of health, food security and nutrition under 
the Pooled Fund has risen compared to the previous 
years. In 2010-2011, healthcare spending under the 
Pooled Fund was just 30% higher than sexual violence 
funding under SSRF, but it is now two to three times more. 
This confirms the trend outlined in the interviews above 
that donors have increasingly broadened their attention 
from addressing sexual violence to strengthening the 
capacity of general health facilities. 
3.5.2  Earmarked funds for sexual violence response
In the previous section we found that actors responding to 
sexual violence increasingly integrate their work into other 
domains, such as health care or multi-sectoral assistance. 
This does not preclude continued supply of funds earmarked 
for sexual violence response. Table 4 lists programmes for 
which funds were earmarked for sexual violence between 
2009 and 2015. It lists the funds allocated to sexual 
violence by the MDTFs as well as bilateral programmes 
allocated by different donors. The large funds we identified 
totalled $124 million over seven years. This figure does not 
include funds made available through INGOs. It shows that 
there is a reduction in funds earmarked for sexual violence 
in the past few years. This can be explained by overall 
diminished funding for DRC, but can also mean that funds 
for sexual violence assistance are increasingly incorporated 
in broader programme budgets. For example, there are 
bilateral funds for adjacent domains, such as reproductive 
health, where the EU alone allocated $201 million for the 
period of 2014-2020 (European Commission, 2014: 11). 
3.5.3 DRC government expenditures for sexual 
violence response
The Congolese state budget for 2014 shows a budget of 
16,746,934,000 Congolese francs (or $18.6 million) for 
the Ministry of Gender, which represents 0.22% of the 
total state budget. While extremely small compared to the 
international funds and the overall state budget, this already 
represents a large growth compared to 2011, when this 
was only 0.1% of the total state budget. At the end of 2014, 
33% of the budget for the Ministry of Gender was paid out. 
In 2011, 75% of the Ministry’s budget went to the 
administration of the Ministry, leaving a budget of 
$838,000 for research on the status of women and 
a variety of services, including the planning and 
coordination of sexual violence interventions (Ministry of 
Budget, 2011). In 2014, 60% went to the administration 
of the ministry and $2.4 million was reserved for activities 
and sub-grants to partners. The figures corroborate the 
observation that the Ministry of Gender has become 
more active. At the same time it illustrates how the 
government’s contribution continues to be almost 
negligible compared to the international commitment, 
which is the case for many sectors. 
3.6 Conclusion
This section discussed the actors active in sexual 
violence response, their understanding of the issue, the 
way they explain their programme on their website and 
changing approaches in practice.
There have been efforts to improve and streamline data 
collection and analysis, and statistics are still subject 
to problems with interpretation and representation. 
Available data indicate that reported incidents on sexual 
violence remain on similar levels. 
The support for actions against sexual violence is still 
substantial, yet there is also a reduction in clearly 
earmarked support in the past few years. This partly 
coincides with a general reduction of funds available 
to DRC, but it may also be a signal that the attention to 
sexual violence is reduced and sexual violence becomes 
more mainstreamed in other types of assistance. 
Compared to the findings in 2011, coordination of sexual 
violence response has improved, with a strengthened role 
for and commitment from Congolese government agents.
We found some remarkable trends. International policy 
and agencies’ websites continue to highlight the conflict-
affected nature of sexual violence, often with reference 
to the ‘rape as a weapon of war’ discourse. Approaches 
on the ground have started to substantially move 
away from this discourse. Recognising deeper gender 
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issues, agencies have increasingly incorporated sexual 
violence in broader approaches to health, gender-based 
violence, women’s empowerment and community-based 
approaches.
On the one hand, this shows an evolution in 
understanding sexual violence as requiring institutional 
changes and community approaches. On the other hand, 
there are also some questions to be raised with this trend. 
When action on sexual violence becomes embedded in 
broader approaches, it is virtually impossible to monitor 
its effects on the prevalence of sexual violence. 
There are also questions to be asked about the gap 
between the representation of sexual violence concerns 
on websites and in international policy and the realities of 
programme implementation on the ground. While some 
agencies no longer present their programmes as action 
against sexual violence, many do. We will come back to 
these questions in the remaining sections.
Table 4: Earmarked funds allocated for sexual violence response
Donor Funds52 Year(s) 
allocated
No. 
years
Operational partners Location53 Focus of projects 
US (Hillary Clinton 
visit)/USAID54
$17,000,000 2009 3 IRC,55 Engender Health, 
others
Medical training, police training, assistance 
to victims of SGBV
SIDA $3,200,000 2009-2010 2 REJUSCO, UNDP NK, SK Justice reform, training, case-assistance, 
justice infrastructure (including SGBV 
components)
SRFF $10,441,088 2010- 2012 2.2 UNOPS, UNHCR, 
UNESCO, OHCHR, UNFPA
SK, IT Impunity, protection and prevention, FARDC, 
services to victims, data mapping (2010-
2011)
Pooled Fund $2,200,000 2010 1 UN agencies Mostly east 2010 alone
SIDA $1,563,506 2010-2011 2 UNDP NK, SK Socio-economic integration of SGBV victims
RNE $9,000,000 2010-2012 3 Heal Africa, ABA MN Access to justice for SGBV survivors
EU11 $8,761,241 2010-2011
2010-2013
2-4 SCIAF, COOPI, Heal 
Africa, AMI
NK, SK Holistic assistance for SGBV survivors
DFID $1,300,000 2011-2013 3 National Ministry of Gender capacity building
USAID $32,200,000 2011-2015 5 IMC57, ABA, COOPI / IMA 
World Health, Heal Africa, 
Panzi
NK, SK, IT, 
MN
USHINDI and CASE: Promoting reintegration, 
behaviour change, care, empowerment, 
psychological support 
USAID $10,000,000 2011-2015 5 IMC NK, SK BBC: Community cohesion in SGBV affected 
areas
ECHO/PMU $2,437,355 2012- 201313 2 PANZI hospital SK Medical assistance for SGBV survivors 
under (SSV)
SRFF $11,021,876 2012-2014 3 UNHCR, UNFPA, UNICEF, 
UNESCO, UNDP, UNOPS
DRC Holistic assistance to SGBV survivors
EU $12,195,122 
(€10,000,000)
2012-2016 5 ASF, RCN, DRC-partners NK, SK, IT PAR-J/UHAKI SAFI: Strengthening 
functioning of and access to justice 
(including SGBV components)
EU56 $2,439,024 
(€2,000,000)
2013 ? ? DRC Healthcare for SGBV victims (pilot project)
UK Foreign Office $310,000 2013 1 PANZI hospital SK Ultrasound and other equipment (pledged 
after visit of William Hague to Panzi)
TOTAL earmarked funds for SGBV $124 million Average annual spending $17.7 million59 
52 Recalculated against the exchange rates on 31st December 2014.
53 NK=North Kivu; SK=South Kivu; IT=Ituri; MN=Maniema. 
54 There is some overlap between the Hillary grant and the USAID projects, of 
which part is funded from the grant. 
55 IRC is the main grantee with $7 million.
56 This amount, representing €6,637,304, originates from the 10th EU 
Development Fund. With a total budget of €561.7 for the period 2008-2013 
it is most likely that other parts of this funding modality are also allocated 
towards sexual violence. The rough thematic division of the 10th EU 
Development Fund: governance €130 million, infrastructure €251 million, 
health €51 million, environment €29 million and other themes (ex. emergency 
aid, agriculture, food security and regional initiatives) €100.6 million 
(European Commission, 2008: 12). 
57 IMC is the main grantee with $10 million.
58 Note that the SSV project at Panzi is running since 2004, and also secured 
funding for 2014 (11th year).
59 The relative value of the budget-share of one project running into 2016 is 
not taken into account, the average has been calculated for the period of 7 years 
(running from 2009 up to 2015 included). 
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This section addresses different domains of sexual 
violence response to find out how practices of sexual 
violence response in eastern DRC are evolving. It starts 
with a subsection on immediate responses to follow-
up rape cases through assistance and investigation in 
violent settings. The next subsections deal with sectoral 
assistance, starting with the medical sector: the provision 
of the general medical facilities and specialised medical 
assistance to sexual violence victims. This is followed by 
psycho-social support, socio-economic support aiming at 
reintegration into community life, capacity development, 
and community response to sexual violence assistance. 
Responses concerning the justice sector and action to 
halt impunity surrounding sexual violence crimes will be 
addressed in the next section. 
4.1 Immediate response to rape in violent 
settings
Eastern DRC consists of some areas that are relatively 
peaceful and other, often more remote, areas that 
continue to experience rebel attacks and violent 
encounters. The question is what responses are being 
made to sexual violence in areas in which rape is 
happening as part of armed conflict or by civilians.
In 2012, the hostilities around the rebel movement M23 
resulted in many rape cases. When M23 took Goma, 
the provincial capital of North Kivu, most agencies had 
to evacuate just when the number of women in need 
of assistance was at its peak. This episode has been 
described by Médécins Sans Frontières (MSF) in their 
report Where is Everyone? (MSF, 2014). Aid agencies 
operate under different security regimes, and many had 
a policy of evacuating their staff and ceasing operations 
when violent encounters happen. The MSF report 
raised questions about the efficiency and independent 
decisiveness of aid. As one of the MSF employees in 
Goma said during our research: ‘When shit hit the fan, 
everybody left. We faced a long and lonely period.’ The 
M23 episode is an example of a broader phenomenon, 
according to MSF. The organisation found that only a few 
agencies were able to respond to needs of people caught 
in violent encounters between rebels and government 
troops. This is the case for all problems, not just sexual 
violence. ‘Activities are highly concentrated on Goma 
and Bukavu, except for some fieldtrips. We feel there is a 
limited provision of services in conflict areas. In Fizi we are 
fairly lonely. Shabunda has a few more.’60
60 Idem. 
4 Sexual violence 
response
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A number of respondents point out that there are in fact 
other agencies as well that respond to sexual violence in 
areas of active conflict, even though they have no longer-
term presence like MSF has in a few places. Emergency 
situations where attacks are reported are discussed 
during coordination meetings to consider which agencies 
can respond.61 The International Rescue Committee 
formed an emergency task force in 2012 to respond to 
signals about attacks. IRC sends in teams of community 
workers, psycho-social care, medical and logistical 
personnel to investigate cases and provide emergency 
services.62 A new initiative is Femme-au-fone, which 
provides women in remote areas with the facilities to 
report sexual violence.63 The ambition of the project is to 
link the documented cases with actors that can provide 
(immediate) assistance. 
While there is activity to follow up emergency cases, 
the issue of under-servicing these cases is generally 
acknowledged. A group of parliamentarians in North Kivu 
were very concerned about the situation in Beni in the 
north of North Kivu where humanitarian needs caused by 
(renewed) conflict involving the Uganda rebel group ADF-
Nalu are very high. There are large volumes of displaced 
people who are largely deprived of humanitarian 
assistance. There are also many cases of sexual 
violence: ‘Most organisations concentrate their actions in 
Rutshuru, Kiwandja, and Masisi [petit Nord]. ... People say 
that there are a lot of means available for the petit Nord. 
We in the “grand Nord” appear to be forgotten.’ 
Our findings confirm the picture that sexual violence 
programming is much more focused on reachable 
areas relatively close to the provincial capitals. We also 
found that most respondents have shifted to areas 
where sexual violence is mainly committed by civilians 
and hence have changed their approach to address 
community-level violence. Only few respondents raised 
questions of continued conflict-related violence and, 
for example, the need for security sector reform. One 
respondent complained about this, stating: ‘I insist that 
partners need to change their approach by studying the 
real causes. If I am sick the doctor cannot prescribe me 
medicines without examining what is wrong with me.’64
61 Interview GOV-M-5 (26 May 2014).
62 Interview INGO-F-15 (May 2014).
63 See Femme au Fone website: http://femmeaufone.net/fr/femme-au-fone. 
64 Interview GOV-M-6 (27 May 2014). 
4.2 Medical response
There has been much emphasis in eastern DRC on 
providing medical care to victims of sexual violence. 
Most eye-catching has been the work of two hospitals: 
Panzi hospital in Bukavu and Heal Africa’s hospital in 
Goma. Both specialise in complicated fistula operations. 
General health facilities are also tasked with dealing with 
sexual violence. 
4.2.1 One-stop approaches
The previous sections described the initiatives to 
introduce one-stop approaches in DRC. This means that 
all services related to sexual violence are found under one 
roof, often combined with transit houses where victims 
can stay for a while. Especially Panzi and Heal Africa have 
been advocating and establishing auxiliary branches in 
rural areas, supported by the World Bank among others. 
The idea of the one-stop approach centres throughout 
the provinces is that victims do not need to travel to the 
main cities to find a place for integrated assistance. 
Nonetheless, the one-stop approach, which was mainly 
associated with the Panzi hospital, was reviewed 
critically by our respondents. This response may have 
been intensified by institutional envy or competition 
between international agencies, but the objections 
resonated with a number of problems identified in our 
previous report. Some respondents argued that victims 
of sexual violence often have additional health problems 
that warrant an integrated health approach more than 
an integrated sexual violence approach.65 The one-stop 
approach, on the other hand, sets services for sexual 
violence apart, and some argue that it would be better 
in the long run to integrate this type of care into normal 
health services.66 These respondents doubted the 
capacity of health personnel, already overburdened, 
to take on new tasks.67 This concern seems justified 
considering the difficulties we observed in previous 
years where services turned out to be integrated in name 
only. One problem is the different timeframe required 
for the responses. Medical care is usually short term, 
whereas legal procedures can drag on for a long time.68 
The notion of a one-stop approach also brings back 
former discussions on the issue of pressure on victims 
to turn to prosecution. This was the case in integrated 
65 Interview UN-F-6 (27 May 2014).
66 Interview UN-M-1 (19 May 2014). 
67 Interview INGO-M-8 (28 May 2014); Interview UN-M-1 (19 May 2014). 
68 Interview UN-M-4 (27 May 2014). 
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legal programmes of the past, especially when these 
programmes had a mandate or log-frame detailing a 
specific number of cases to bring to court every year.69 
4.2.2 Specialised care or strengthening rural health 
structures?
The one-stop approach builds up specialised care for 
sexual violence provided by hospitals like Panzi and 
Heal Africa, creating a parallel system of care for sexual 
violence. In practice these institutes tend to respond to 
broader health concerns: Panzi has been expanding its 
services to incorporate neo-natal care, family planning 
and HIV treatment.70 
A different approach is to use funding earmarked for 
sexual violence to build the capacity of medical facilities 
in the state-defined zones de santé. This approach is 
taken by the USAID-financed Ushindi programme. 
One of the issues with integrating responses to sexual 
violence concerns the costs of treatment. The national 
protocol on sexual violence response prescribes that 
victims of sexual violence must be given free treatment 
in the hospitals. In that sense, there is no difference 
between a specialised hospital and a general hospital. 
However, as a director of a general hospital explained, it 
is difficult to decide what falls under free treatment, as 
many women have additional health problems that are 
not the direct result of sexual violence. General hospitals 
only provide free care for issues directly related to sexual 
violence, whereas the specialised hospitals – with a lot of 
external funding – can afford to provide all care for free. 
As the director said: ‘Only Panzi can do everything for free, 
including social support.’71 
Several respondents were concerned that creating a 
separate system for sexual violence assistance creates 
an imbalance. First, there is the risk that specialised 
institutions increasingly function outside of the 
governance of the normal health system: ‘There are many 
small clinics in the Province, but the means are not going 
there. All successful clinics and hospitals are run by Panzi 
and it is difficult to be in competition with them.’72 Several 
stakeholders also fear that medical facilities continue to 
be disproportionally available for sexual violence, but not 
for other diseases like malaria (300,000 cases a year in 
69 Interview UN-F-6 (27 May 2014). 
70 Interview CNGO-F-3 (20 May 2014). 
71 Interview MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL, November 2013
72 Interview CNGO-F-2/CNGO-M3/CNGO-M-4 (20 May 2014).
South Kivu), respiratory diseases (more or less similar 
numbers) and simple conditions like diarrhoea.73 D’Errico 
et al. (2013) also present evidence that the needs of 
vulnerable women are much broader than just those 
related to rape: ‘vulnerability is caused by a variety of 
barriers to health, of which rape is just one among many’ 
(53). 
The issue was also well illustrated by the following story 
narrated by a director of a Congolese NGO, showing the 
continued need to build health facilities and capacities 
from a sustainability perspective:
One day we were in Fizi. There was a government 
health clinic, renovated by Oxfam or another NGO. It 
was well constructed, but it had not been in operation 
for 15 months. The operator left. He had no assistant. 
There was nothing at all. People would die from a 
simple fever. 
That same week, a mobile clinic came with a doctor 
and a nurse. They registered 177 women patients. 
They did not even look at men. They planned to stay 
for 24 hours, worked the whole night, and were 
able to extend for one day. Still, the military had to 
come in, because people were angry when they left. 
They came to look for victims of sexual violence, but 
people came with all kinds of different problems.74 
4.2.3 Fistula operations
A fistula is a tear in the vaginal or rectal wall resulting in 
incontinence. The condition of fistula is often associated 
with social isolation because the women suffering from 
this condition always smell of urine. Fistula is therefore 
considered a major contributing factor to stigmatising 
victims of sexual violence.
While the condition of fistula is often discussed in relation 
to violent sexual crimes, in reality it occurs much more 
often as a result from complications during childbirth. 
In 2011, we quoted medical doctors working on fistula 
programmes that less than 3% of the cases could be 
attributed to a direct consequence of sexual violence. 
This was in sharp contrast with the representation 
of fistula projects as sexual violence response. Our 
interviews in 2014 with representatives of the hospitals 
and other medical agencies confirmed that the vast 
majority of fistula cases (over 95%) result from labour 
73 Interview UN-M-1 (19 May 2014).
74 Interview CNGO-F-1/CNGO-M-2 (19 May 2014). 
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complications.75 Heal Africa states on its website that 
fistula ‘is caused by labour complications due to lack of 
access to basic healthcare, giving birth at a premature 
age, or heinous rape.’76 The annual reports of Panzi 
hospital provide a similar message, but the website of the 
hospital is less clear. The section on the fistula project 
does not make reference to the cause of the condition, 
and as the entire site is focused on sexual violence, the 
text on fistulas can easily be understood as referring to 
sexual violence.77 
It could be argued that the relative lack of transparency 
about the links between fistula surgery and sexual 
violence is not a major problem. After all, the story of 
sexual violence helps to generate the funding required for 
surgery and allows the hospitals to assist women with this 
condition, often at no cost. From a medical ethics point of 
view, women’s entitlement to surgery should not depend 
on what caused the condition, and it could be considered 
a blessing in disguise that these services are now freely 
available to all women.
There are, however, also problematic sides to the idea 
that fistula mainly results from sexual violence. It means 
that the major cause of fistula, namely childbirth in dire 
conditions or by very young women, is not sufficiently 
recognised and addressed. Pregnancy among young girls, 
in particular, is prevalent but the problem is overlooked 
because of the overwhelming attention being paid to rape. 
4.2.4 Distribution of PEP kits and other medicines
PEP kits are Post-Exposure Prophylaxis kits that are 
meant for people that have accidentally been exposed to 
the HIV virus. In eastern DRC, PEP kits are emergency kits 
containing different items for victims of sexual violence. 
They usually include antibiotics to prevent sexually 
transmitted diseases and HIV infection, a pregnancy 
test and the morning-after pill. The content varies and 
there are, for example, kits distributed by faith-based 
organisations that do not contain the morning-after pill. 
The PEP kits are supposed to be administered within a 
72-hour timeframe after exposure to sexual violence. 
In response to concerns about a lack of medical 
equipment for sexual violence victims, there has been 
a rush of PEP kit programmes in the past years. As one 
75 Interview INGO-M-9 (29 May 2014); Interview UN-M-4 (27 May 2014). 
76 http://archives.healafrica.org/health-care-p-20.html.
77 Panzi Hospital, www.panzihospital.org/projects/panzi-hospital/fistula-
project.
respondent said: ‘You would find them everywhere’.78 
PEP kits were largely distributed through general medical 
hospitals, clinics and pharmacies.
The oversupply and lack of coordination resulted in a 
disorderly use of the kits. They were often opened for 
the antibiotics that were sold for all kinds of ailments, 
while morning-after pills were sold to girls having had 
unprotected sex. Yet the large number of PEP kits 
distributed was reported as if it were an indicator for the 
prevalence of sexual violence.
In view of these problems, since late 2012 all medication 
that is provided by medical agencies has to be kept by 
and distributed through the designated pharmacy of the 
health zone. This includes the distribution of PEP kits. This 
vastly increased centralised control over the distribution 
of the kits and made it possible to better support the 
pharmacies with generic medicines for other medical 
conditions.79 It also contributed to the mainstreaming 
of sexual violence response, and it enhanced the status 
of government health structures because patients 
feel it is the government providing them, rather than a 
variety of NGOs.80 The Ministry of Health has also issued 
instructions on the reporting of the distribution. Health 
facilities need to be clear on the conditions of patients 
treated, to prevent a generalised report about the 
treatment of sexual violence victims.
4.3 Psycho-social assistance
Psycho-social assistance is an important aspect of sexual 
violence care given the grave psychological problems 
that may result from rape, often aggravated by social 
problems caused by the lack of a safe and supportive 
environment. 
Psycho-social assistance is being delivered in a 
variety of ways. Different forms of listening projects 
are organised where participants are counselled by 
trained psycho-social workers, either individually or in 
groups. The listening projects are often embedded in the 
setting of temporary shelters created for rape victims 
(maisons d’écoute, or centres de transit). There are also 
community-based approaches: for example, the Centre 
d’Assistance Médico Psychosociale (CAMPS), one of the 
most specialised agencies in psycho-social care, works 
through the formation of community-based groups of 
78 Interview UN-M-5 (27 May 2014). 
79 Interview UN-M-4 (27 May 2014). 
80 Idem. 
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around ten women, who organise small projects and 
sessions together. IMA World Health in North Kivu has 
a similar approach with community groups headed by a 
woman leader who is a trained volunteer.81 These are not 
only directed to the needs of the participants, combining 
psychological care with socio-economic projects, but also 
to awareness-raising to promote the social acceptance of 
victims of sexual violence. Psycho-social care then blends 
into prevention: raising awareness about sexual violence 
in communities.
According to UNFPA figures, psycho-social care is the 
kind of service that is most available to victims of sexual 
violence. In the first half of 2013, 90% of reported sexual 
violence victims received some kind of psycho-social and 
socio-economic support (Douma and Hilhorst, 2012). In 
2013, according to the cumulated statistics issued by the 
data analysis working group (under the lead of UNFPA), 
67% of the victims in North Kivu and 99% of victims in 
South Kivu received psycho-social assistance (UNFPA, 
2013a; UNFPA, 2013b). 
The reality behind these impressive figures is not very 
clear. There are some intensive programmes around the 
shelters, for example in the project of V-day in Bukavu, 
where a small number of women reside for a year and 
have their confidence boosted through a range of training 
programmes, including leadership training and self-
defence. Among the 99% figure for South Kivu, however, 
there may also be many one-off conversations held with 
women when they report to NGOs to seek assistance. 
A number of respondents considered psycho-social care 
a weakly developed domain, as trained psychologists 
and psychiatric care are rare.82 Several respondents cite 
a study that found that in 15% of cases, post-traumatic 
stress syndromes develop, requiring specialised care.83 
Thus, specialised care needs to be provided for these 
15%, whereas the 85% could thus be assisted with less 
intensive care, such as community-based counselling. 
One of the rationales behind the one-stop approach 
discussed earlier was to enable medical personnel to 
provide counselling as well. 
81 For a study on a similar programme implemented between 2007 and 2009 
by Maltheser, see Steiner et al. (2009).
82 Interview CNGO-M-14/CNGO-F-8 (27 May 2014); Interview UN-M-5 (27 May 
2014); Interview UN-F-5 (29 May 2014). 
83 Interview INGO-F-1 (22 May 2014); Interview INGO-M-8 (28 May 2014). 
4.4 Socio-economic reintegration
According to the statistics of UNFPA over 2013, socio-
economic reintegration services for women survivors of 
sexual violence was extremely small: 0.5% in North Kivu 
and 3.7% in South Kivu. This number refers to individual 
packages given to women who were reported as victims 
of sexual violence in 2013.
Activities traditionally include the provision of small 
livestock for home breeding, vocational training (such 
as sewing lessons), or the provision of support for micro-
business. Socio-economic activities are often part of the 
formation of groups for awareness-raising or psycho-
social support, but evaluations have shown they may 
be too small to have any significant impact.84 During a 
focus group discussion among men in Walungu, they 
complained: ‘The support given to women is a problem. 
There are moments when they gave 10 dollar, but that 
is only for one day. There is no real support to raise their 
children.’ Also, such monetary support is also mostly used 
for other urgent family needs, such as medical care or 
school fees. 
A number of respondents suggested that socio-economic 
monetary or in-kind packages are being reduced, and 
a lack of funding available for the socio-economic 
component was mentioned.85 Instead, community-
based approaches have increasingly become the norm. 
Rather than ‘reintegration’ of individual victims, the 
discourse seems to have shifted towards community 
autonomisation (self-reliance).
Several agencies work with local groups of women and 
men who are encouraged to start rotating saving and 
credit groups (village saving and loan associations)86 in 
which participants pay a small amount of money every 
week. A part of these contributions is set aside for 
emergency situations and the remainder is given to each 
of the members in rotation, so that each occasionally 
receives a slightly larger sum of money, for example to buy 
some goods to trade. 
In addition to these associations, there are also some 
more business-oriented activities. The International 
Medical Corps, for example, helps women to develop 
a micro-business case and provide support and 
supervision to realise these plans (for example in trading 
84 Interview GOV-M-5 (27 May 2014). 
85 Interview UN-M-6 (28 May 2014).
86 Interview INGO-F-10 (29 May 2014).
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tomatoes).87 Even though support is still modest, it is now 
mostly non-monetary and increasingly focused on the 
supervision and accompaniment of the business cases. 
One respondent explained that the provision of socio-
economic support is a complex matter: ‘When we do it 
seriously, people always complain that we have too few 
beneficiaries’.88
4.5 Capacity development for prevention
Many actors responding to sexual violence incorporate 
activities for capacity development for prevention in their 
programme. Because these activities often cut across 
other activities and are not specifically addressed by one 
of the coordination working groups, the effectiveness of 
capacity development is rarely reviewed in coordination 
meetings. Monitoring of training efforts is almost entirely 
absent.89
Capacity development is directed to institutions, 
especially in the medical and legal domains, and to 
communities. Capacity development can take the form 
of financial support or the deployment of personnel, such 
as the transfer of gynaecological surgery techniques 
to staff of local hospitals. The main method of capacity 
development, however, concerns training.
There is a large variety of training for women, 
communities and institutions. Examples of the latter 
are training of legal practitioners on various aspects of 
Congolese and international legislation in relation to 
the repression of impunity surrounding sexual violence, 
courses offered to police officers in investigation 
techniques for the pre-judicial phase, or awareness 
training to government representatives or politicians. 
Training at the community level mainly concerns 
awareness-raising to prevent sexual violence and to avoid 
the social rejection of violated women or children born 
from rape. 
There is little coordination, which causes duplication, 
overlap or contradiction in what is offered. During the 
focus group with male citizens of Walungu the following 
issue was raised: 
87 Interview INGO-F-1 (22 May 2014). 
88 Interview CNGO-M-2 (22 November 2014).
89 Interview INGO-F-12 (22 May 2014).
There was a time they came in great numbers to 
train us. We had more than 15 awareness trainings. 
The difficulty was they did not know what others 
had already given. They were almost the same. 
They separate the men from the women and then 
discussion together. ‘Why did you not intervene when 
your women were raped?’ They only differ in the way 
they do it, like in school, when teachers have different 
teaching styles.90 
In the case of training for professionals like the police, 
legal officers or state agents, there is also the issue of 
multiplication. One top legal person said: ‘I have told my 
magistrates to stop attending these trainings. The Conseil 
Supérieur de la Magistrature told all magistrates to go 
to Kinshasa for training again. All these workshops and 
trainings only paralyse our legal institutions.’ 91
While there are many training events, they are each of a 
short duration, and hence only scratch the surface, not 
offering truly professional training. Questions are also 
raised with regard to the capacities of the trainers. One 
public prosecutor interviewed was particularly sceptical: 
‘They want to explain the law to us through seminars. I 
have a career of 24 years as a magistrate. Do they really 
think they can teach me something by sending a young 
American lawyer that maybe got his degree three years 
ago, and has not seen anything of the realities of our 
country? It is an insult.’92 
Capacity development of the government beyond training 
is not widespread. More attention has recently been given 
to collaboration with coordinating state institutions in the 
domain of sexual violence (Section 3), yet this has not 
translated into structural capacity development efforts. 
NGOs are often critical of the Congolese state functioning, 
which is seen as ineffective and corrupt, and are 
therefore reluctant to finance the government. ‘There is 
now more commitment in the Ministry of Health, but their 
human and financial capacity is a different question. It will 
take a really long time for them to get it right.’93 Another 
respondent from the health sector said: ‘We are looking at 
how to disengage, but the government does not know how 
to put structures in place and does not pay salaries.’94
90 Focus group-3, male citizens Izege/Walungu (14 May 2014). 
91 Interview GOV-M-4 (28 May 2014). 
92 Idem. 
93 Interview INGO-F-1 (22 May 2014). 
94 Interview INGO-M-9 (29 May 2014). 
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Many actors make no distinction between different parts 
of the state. They see the central government that is 
not disbursing allocated budgets, yet local government 
officials charged with programme assistance may be 
willing but unable to do a good job. As a local officer of 
one of South Kivu’s divisions says: ‘Everybody says the 
state does nothing and is incapable. It is true: I have 
never seen that funds from the state budget for sexual 
violence are disbursed for my work. Yet I am here, but 
who will listen to me?’95
4.6 Aid effectiveness and appropriateness
This section addresses some concerns raised 
by respondents about the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of the assistance for sexual violence. 
Citizens involved in the focus group discussion often have 
strong opinions about aid. Also, respondents from aid 
organisations and state institutions are often very critical 
in the confidential environment of an interview. One 
problem with these opinions, especially citizen opinions, 
is that they may be based on experiences in the past. 
But they do give an indication of how sexual violence 
response is being perceived. 
A major critique concerns the effectiveness of funds 
allocated to sexual violence assistance. The general 
idea is that the lion’s share of multi-million dollar projects 
is consumed by programme management costs of 
international organisations operating in DRC, and does 
not reach or benefit beneficiaries. A coordinator of one 
of these large programmes says: ‘It is a problem with all 
types of assistance. On paper programmes are large, but 
in the field the impact is very limited. We stir up a lot of 
foam. … The way in which the reality is addressed gives a 
feeling of marketing to raise funds.’96 Accountability is a 
related concern, as another NGO officer adds: ‘There is a 
complete lack of quality, proximity and accountability on 
the ground level. … It is common and still continuing.’97
Community members are sceptical about aid 
effectiveness. The critique is directed not only at sexual 
violence programmes but more generally at the credibility 
of aid organisations and state institutions. These are 
mainly seen as ‘bouffeurs’ (eating up the funds) or 
‘bouffons’ (dodgers, not doing anything, not respecting 
promises). Many people interviewed express feelings of 
frustration and incapability to influence aid flows. A Goma 
95 Interview GOV-M-2 (21 May 2014). 
96 Interview INGO-M-6 (26 May 2014). 
97 Interview INGO-F-2/INGO-M-3 (29 May 2014). 
citizen stated: ‘If only I would have the possibility to visit 
the World Bank, I would tell them to stop giving money to 
our government. We hear on the radio they give millions. 
When they come for monitoring, they only show schools 
that were built long before. All the money goes into the 
pockets and stomachs of certain people, but we don’t see 
any impact.’98 
The highly critical attitude to aid agencies is particularly 
strong in urban areas, where people hear many rumours 
on the radio or from their neighbours and are confronted 
on a daily basis with the large cars of aid workers with a 
large spending capacity. 
A second issue that recurs in many interviews is an 
imbalance between the attention paid to sexual violence 
and the attention given to other conflict-related atrocities 
or other problems. There is a famous joke about a woman 
coming to an aid agency to seek help: 
Woman: ‘The rebels came, they killed my husband 
and destroyed my house and burnt my field. I have 
nothing left’
Aid agent: ‘And have you been raped’?
Woman: ‘No, I was not raped’.
Aid agent: ‘Sorry, then we cannot help you’. 
The lack of attention for crimes that are not related to 
sexual violence frustrates the public and feeds negative 
opinions about action against sexual violence. ‘When you 
kill somebody in Congo, there is no follow-up. People lose 
goods, they are beaten, they are injured – there are all 
kinds of abuses that receive no follow-up. But when you 
rape somebody everybody comes after you.’99
4.7 Conclusion
This section addressed how assistance is taking shape 
(and changing) within the different domains of sexual 
violence response, in particular emergency aid and 
medical, psycho-social and socio-economic assistance 
as well as capacity development. Action against impunity 
and legal assistance will be addressed in the next section.
The section shows some major trends in assistance. First, 
we notice that agencies are increasingly veering away 
from addressing sexual violence in relation to conflict and 
concentrating on sexual violence committed by civilians. 
98 Focus group-10, male citizens from Goma (29 May 2014). 
99 Interview DO-F-2 (21 May 2014). 
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This contrasts with the attention to sexual violence on 
agency websites, which continue to emphasise conflict-
related violence. 
Second, we found that aid has become more 
integrated. There are two strategies being implemented 
simultaneously but which may be contradictory in 
practice. On the one hand, there is the tendency to build 
specialised institutions for action on sexual violence, 
with increasingly broad services, including general health 
services and psychological and legal assistance. On the 
other hand, there is the tendency to mainstream the 
attention to sexual violence by strengthening existing 
health facilities so that they can better respond to sexual 
violence in their area.
A final major finding is that respondents in this research 
often consider assistance for sexual violence ineffective, 
in particular because of the overhead and programme 
costs, where agencies are seen to ‘eat’ the assistance 
themselves. They also complain of the neglect of crimes 
and problems not related to sexual violence. The fact that 
people complain about the unevenness of international 
assistance is also a token of the fact that the awareness 
campaigns around sexual violence have been effective in 
their reach, albeit with mixed results.
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One of the more prominent aspects of the response 
to sexual violence in DRC is the fight against impunity. 
Through the concerted efforts of international, national 
and civic actors, awareness about the need to use the 
law to combat sexual violence has increased and the 
number of cases that have been brought to court has 
grown significantly over the years. The way in which victims 
of sexual violence are taken seriously in legal practice 
stands out positively compared to many other countries, 
despite the generally weak institutional development 
and continued insecurity. The international community’s 
interventions, working in conjunction with local civil 
society, are seen to have shifted governance in the domain 
of sexual violence considerably, leading to a higher level 
of prosecution and a growing local awareness that victims 
should be cared for and protected (Lake, 2014a). 
This chapter first summarises how the need to fight 
impunity is constructed by the international community, 
as well as through measures taken by the Congolese 
government. Subsection 5.2 discusses the Minova trial 
against army personnel accused of mass rape. Subsection 
5.3 summarises the findings of the 2011 research into 
legal action against sexual violence, and presents findings 
about current trends in the types of support for legal 
action. Subsection 5.4 looks into the specific challenge 
of dealing with legal cases involving minors. Subsection 
5.5 presents the 2014 findings on the legal cases and 
compares them with the outcomes of 2011 to analyse 
similarities, differences and trends. Finally, subsection 5.6 
details some of the social impact of legal action against 
sexual violence, mainly in the city of Bukavu. There are 
many indicators that the increased opportunity to bring 
sexual violence charges to court brings about widespread 
threats, accusations and distortion.
5.1 The compelling need to fight impunity
A lot more sexual violence cases come before court 
now than some years ago. It can thus be said that the 
Congolese justice system, influenced by and international 
pressure and awareness-raising, now takes prosecution 
of sexual violence seriously. This is also supported by 
improvements in proceedings, as our legal analysis in 
subsection 5.5 demonstrates. 
Yet, at the same time, high levels of impunity persist, 
which international actors ascribe to the failing of the 
system: weak governance, low capacities, and the lack 
of material and financial resources of the Congolese 
state to create an effective judicial system (Maya, 2011; 
BCNUDH, 2014: 14-25).
5 Legal action 
against sexual 
violence
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It is generally argued that the number of sexual violence 
crimes that result in prosecution is minimal compared to 
the number of incidents. This is caused by major difficulties 
in identifying and arresting perpetrators, especially those 
from rebel factions. The weak forensic investigation 
capacities of the police also mean that solid proof is absent 
in most cases, which adversely affects the ability of judges 
to make a well-informed judgement. Corrupt practices 
mean that rich and powerful perpetrators in particular 
escape justice or are wrongfully released from prison.
The crisis of confidence in the justice system causes the 
majority of victims to refrain from filing a case. They fear 
retaliation by the accused and know that compensation 
is hardly ever paid, which for many victims is a more 
important means of redress than incarceration.
As also addressed in section 3.4.1, these aspects lead the 
international community to put a high premium on fighting 
impunity in case of sexual violence crimes, including 
prosecution of sexual violence as a war crime by the ICC. 
The primary aim of the 2014 Global Summit to End Sexual 
Violence in Conflict was ‘to shatter the culture of impunity 
for sexual violence in conflict’. The idea is that without the 
threat of prosecution and punishment, sexual violence will 
not be ended. This should start with a cultural change to 
acknowledge sexual violence as a crime. 
In DRC, legal action against sexual violence has been 
a major priority. The 2006 law on sexual violence was 
adopted even before the new constitution. In a further 
attempt to fight impunity, the government voted in a 
new law in 2013 to make it possible for Appeal Courts 
to prosecute international war crimes (including sexual 
violence) under ICC charters.100 This is a major step, as 
sexual violence crimes committed by foreign troops could 
previously not be prosecuted in the country.
The government has also recently changed the rules for 
provisional liberty. Normally, the constitution and relevant 
legislation allows convicts to get provisional liberty after 
having served one-third of their sentence, provided they 
receive a recommendation from the prison director 
for ‘good behaviour’. We observed in 2011 that with 
international organisations paying so much attention to 
sexual violence, prison directors and prosecutors were 
reluctant to recommend violence convicts. In 2013, 
the highest military prosecutor circulated a formal 
communiqué to all military courts in DRC that provisional 
100 Interview GOV-M-3 (24 May 2014). 
liberty for military convicts of sexual violence should no 
longer be granted. In early 2015, the Ministry of Justice 
formalised the exclusion of provisional liberty for sexual 
violence convicts. According to a highly experienced lawyer 
from Kinshasa, this exclusion was the direct result of 
international pressure, while the measure is profoundly 
unconstitutional.101 As a result, the rights of people 
convicted of sexual violence are increasingly restricted. 
The need to fight impunity is based on the idea that 
prosecution and conviction sets an example and has a 
deterring influence. This may well be the case in situations 
where the justice system generally functions well. In 
DRC, however, there is a severe crisis of confidence and 
legitimacy in the system, whereby trials more often confirm 
people’s perceptions of the unfairness of the system than 
have a deterring effect.102 
5.2 The Minova trial
The problems with the prosecution of sexual violence 
crimes in DRC, as well as the problems of supporting 
justice by external means, are well illustrated by the Minova 
trial. On the 20 November 2012, 135 Minova citizens were 
said to have been raped by members of the Congolese 
army. The exact number is not clear, and like in the Luvungi 
case discussed in section 3.3.2, the estimates are varying 
and disputed, with one source even estimating 1,000 
victims.103
The international community strongly pushed for a trial 
and in November 2013 the Minova trial started in Goma, 
with 39 soldiers charged with rape and a variety of other 
crimes. The trial started with high expectations, a ‘beacon 
of hope’ (Enough Project, 2014), where the Congolese 
government took active responsibility for prosecuting 
alleged perpetrators of sexual violence. International 
media followed the proceeding of the trials closely. A BBC 
documentary suggested that the rapes had even been 
carried out on the orders of some in army hierarchy. Based 
on very thin evidence, FARDC-experts Baaz and Verweijen 
considered this documentary ‘irresponsible, sensationalist 
journalism that hampers, rather than facilitates, the efforts 
to tackle the problems of large-scale sexual violence’ 
(Congo Siasa, 2013).
101 Telephone interview by one of the authors with a lawyer about a particular 
court case (June 2015). 
102 See for example Baaz, Stern and Verweijen (2013); Lake (2014a); Lake 
(2014b). 
103 The 1,000 estimate most likely includes victims of looting, by media reports 
presented as rape victims. See for example the numbers cited at: Cordaid 
(2014a), Al Jazeera (2014) and Global Post (2014a).
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The verdict was pronounced in May 2014: Of the 39 
defendants, 14 were acquitted, 22 sentenced to 10 or 20 
years in prison for pillaging and breaking rank, and three 
given a life sentence in relation to rape charges. Thirteen 
of the 14 acquitted were officers, whereas nearly all 
convicts were low-ranking soldiers. There was an outcry 
from the UN, international human rights organisations 
as well as a large number of Congolese organisations. 
The UN human rights office said it was ‘disappointed’ 
about the verdict, adding the ‘decision fell short of the 
expectations of the numerous victims and confirmed 
the shortcoming of the country’s justice system’ (UN, 
2014). Martin Kobler, the head of the UN mission in DRC, 
said he was ‘personally disappointed’. The International 
Federation for Human Rights called the high level of 
acquittals ‘a new insult to the victims of sexual violence’ 
(International Federation of Human Rights, 2014). 
Lawyers Without Borders calls the verdict ‘unsatisfactory’. 
The outrage seemed to assume that all soldiers put to 
trial were guilty, and that the sole acceptable outcome 
would have been conviction. There was no presumption 
of innocence until proven guilty. In the months after the 
verdict, more nuanced reactions came out, providing 
some windows on the multi-layered realities of this trial. 
Human Rights Watch considered the military judge as 
one with experience and spoke positively about the 
application of the definitions of crimes and modes of 
liability under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, which is a very rare thing for a domestic 
court to do (Lake, 2014c). The degree of participation of 
victims in the proceedings was significant, compared to 
other court cases, and measures to disguise and protect 
the victims (such as closed hearings) were respected 
(Human Rights Watch, 2014). 
A Congolese human rights activist pointed out that the 
core problem of the Minova trial were flaws in the pre-
judicial phase. ‘The main problem is that investigations 
have not been done well. It is not up to the judge to re-do 
that work.’104 In other words, the evidence presented at 
trial was insufficient and could not have legally motivated 
conviction in most of the cases. Human Rights Watch 
adds ‘there were also indications of interference by senior 
military officers and an unwillingness to investigate and 
prosecute the most senior officers bearing command 
responsibility’ (Human Rights Watch, 2014). This is 
supported by work done by Lake, who argues that the 
outcomes of criminal trials involving military officers 
104  Interview UN-M-1 (21 May 2014). 
in DRC very much depends on internal arrangements, 
whereby those who have fallen out with hierarchy are at 
greater risk of conviction (Lake, 2014c). 
In relation to this, the Enough Project draws two important 
lessons from the Minova trial experience: ‘The Minova 
trial offers constructive lessons as DRC continues to 
pursue justice: prosecutors and defense attorneys need 
more time, coordination, and resources to build viable 
cases and high-level perpetrators must be stripped of 
their de facto impunity’ (Enough Project, 2014).
A Kinshasa-based diplomat stated that donor 
representatives in Kinshasa realised that the pressure 
they had exercised on the Congolese government had in 
fact contributed to an imbalanced trial – a hasty decision 
to charge the highest military court with the task of 
dealing with the trial. The operational war tribunal (the 
Marshall court) was only established in 2010 and its 
limited experience affected the proceedings. A further 
disadvantage of the tribunal is that it does not offer the 
possibility of appeal. 
What the Minova trial shows is that expectations of the 
deterrent effect of prosecutions in the Congolese context 
are overrated. The characteristics and functioning of 
the Congolese justice system and the specific (conflict) 
context in which it operates mean that impunity, real or 
perceived, prevails. 
5.3 Support to the justice sector
In recent years, the lion’s share of legal support offered 
by organisations has been for the prosecution of sexual 
violence cases, mainly through the provision of legal 
assistance to victims in both civil and military trials. 
Such assistance takes the shape of advice, based on 
which victims can decide whether they prefer to go to 
court or not, and by providing them with a lawyer and 
accompanying them during the trial. 
In relation to legal assistance, there is a large discrepancy 
between the number of victims that are reported to have 
had legal assistance and the actual number of court 
cases. First, the number of cases that receive legal 
assistance is low in comparison with the total number of 
cases reported. In 2013, UNFPA reports state that 15% of 
the 10,706 sexual violence cases reported in South Kivu 
were given legal assistance, i.e. 1,605 cases. In North 
Kivu, 29% of 6,898 cases were given legal assistance, 
i.e. 2,000 cases. Second, the percentage of sexual 
violence cases that make it to the prosecutor’s office 
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(meaning the prosecutor will look into them) is small. A 
high-ranking legal officer in North Kivu said during the 
interview that the four civil prosecution institutions in 
North Kivu (PG Goma, PGI Goma, PG Butembo, PG Beni) 
together registered 1,293 cases of sexual violence 
between 2006 (when the law on sexual violence was 
adopted) and 2013. This means on average 162 per year 
in the entire province. It can be reasonably argued that 
even fewer were concluded. When figures are released on 
‘legal assistance’, the assistance may be limited in many 
cases to providing basic advice on legal rights, only rarely 
standing for actual legal accompaniment of victims. 
Other projects intend to strengthen the presence and 
functioning of legal institutions, especially in rural areas, 
through infrastructural and material support (refurbishing 
court rooms and prisons, providing office equipment). For 
example, the Congolese state, in part with support from 
international organisations, has in recent years boosted 
the number of Tribunaux de Paix (smaller courts in rural 
areas). But as these have no competency on sexual 
violence (or other capital crimes for that matter), cases 
still have to be referred to and handled by auxiliaries of 
Tribunaux de Grande Instance (High Tribunals), which 
are only found in the provincial capitals or larger urban 
conglomerations. The distance and costs involved 
continue to present a major obstacle to rural victims’ 
access to justice. To overcome this, organisations support 
and fund mobile courts (chambres foraines), on which we 
will further elaborate in following subsection. 
In recent years organisations have also invested in 
capacity development of legal personnel, for example 
by raising awareness about laws and procedures on 
sexual violence. The weak performance of the justice 
sector has prompted capacity-building efforts, such as 
in 2012 the start of a multi-million-dollar programme to 
strengthen the justice system in eastern DRC Uhaki Safi 
(or Programme d’Appui en Renforcement de la Justice à 
l’Est, PARJ-E, a follow-up programme of REJUSCO), funded 
by the EU, Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF) and RCN Justice 
& Démocratie. The programme focuses on institutional 
capacity building in order to redress systemic injustices, 
and is not specifically earmarked for sexual violence. As 
discussed in section 4.5, however, there are concerns 
about the quality and effectiveness of such training. 
5.3.1 The mobile courts
The mobile courts in DRC are a temporary facility to 
provide justice. They are ‘temporary courts that are 
explicitly contemplated under Congolese law and which 
operate for a limited period of time in remote areas. 
A full team of justice sector professionals participate 
in these trials, including judges, prosecutors, defence 
lawyers, and bailiffs’ (Maya, 2011: 34). Mobile courts 
usually last around 10 days. They are usually funded and 
in part organised by INGOs and they privilege areas with 
weak investigation or prosecution capacities. They are 
organised on an ad-hoc basis. For example, under a UNDP 
project over a two-year period (2011-2012), 16 mobile 
courts were organised. In total, 198 days of hearings were 
held, 206 cases disposed (with a 60% benchmark for 
SGBV cases attached to funding eligibility) and – as noted 
in the project evaluation cited under ‘achievements’ – 
a conviction rate of 78% (UNDP, 2014: 9-11). For the 
organisation of the mobile courts, UNDP collaborates with 
organisations like the American Bar Association (ABA), 
ASF, MONUSCO, and the joint human rights office of the 
UN. The budget for the UNDP project was $155,000, 
with costs per mobile court in general being estimated at 
$25,000 with 70% allocated to per diems of mobile court 
staff (legal personnel). 
The 2011 research noted a number of critical issues 
with regard to the mobile courts that can be briefly 
summarised as follows:
 ■ Scattered and uncoordinated support to mobile 
courts by various actors, giving courts the chance to 
negotiate or seek out the highest-funding partner. 
 ■ Their timeframes were generally too short to allow for 
detailed investigations and hearings.
 ■ Linked to this, procedural violations were noted, 
especially in the pre-jurisdictional phase and in some 
cases the absence of the possibility of appeal. 
 ■ Mobile courts were in some cases organised away 
from the communities where the crimes happened, 
diminishing the awareness-raising effect of the trials. 
 ■ The large influence of supporting INGOs, who 
suggested cases and areas for mobile courts, 
undermined the independence of the judiciary.
 ■ Sexual violence cases were privileged over other 
crimes, as funding was earmarked for sexual violence, 
again undermining the independence of the judiciary.
 ■ Support for military courts was privileged over civilian 
mobile courts, because the former are seen to be 
more competent, effective and rigorous in relation to 
sexual violence crimes. 
 ■ Legal support was provided for victims but was weak 
or absent for the defence of suspects to the detriment 
of just proceedings.
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 ■ Moral pressure was put on judges to convict. Per 
diems and in some cases motivational fees paid 
to the legal staff may have resulted in subjective 
treatment of cases. 
 ■ Time-consuming multiple trips to the field for the 
mobile courts often left permanent jurisdictions 
in urban settings understaffed, with other cases 
stockpiling and lingering. 
Three years later, in 2014, a number of substantial 
improvements were found in relation to these issues. 
The main stakeholders have made efforts to harmonise 
approaches to supporting mobile courts through a 
coordinating task force. International organisations 
increasingly leave the decision of when and how to 
organise the mobile hearings (including the cases to be 
dealt with) to the court, having realised that their support 
created a ‘state within a state’. Motivational payments to 
legal staff are increasingly avoided, and daily allowance 
standards have been harmonised.105 Fees for lawyers 
who defend victims have also been streamlined. The task 
force has also worked to improve the defence capacities 
of the accused by giving support to the bar association 
that offers pro-deo assistance to suspects.106 As the 
Judge-President of the Bukavu tribunal stated: ‘We should 
not interpret impunity in a single manner, or else we will 
convict the innocent.’107 
Problems remain with limited time available and the 
pressure to deal with a lot of cases in each trial. Finally, 
it seems that funding for mobile courts continues to be 
mainly earmarked for sexual violence, although some 
organisations such as ASF also support cases on land 
rights.108 
5.4 Sexual violence against minors
In 2011, it was found that a large share of the cases that 
are reported to the police concern cases of youths of 
minor age. Intercourse with a girl below the age of 18 is 
considered rape in the law on sexual violence. However, 
behind many of these cases were stories of consensual 
liaisons between a girl and her boyfriend (locally called 
copinage), or a girl and an older lover, the so-called sugar 
daddy. 
105 Interview UN-F-5 (29 May 2014). 
106 Interview INGO-M-1 (21 May 2014); Interview UN-M-3/UN-F-4 (23 May 
2014); Interview UN-F-5 (29 May 2014). 
107 Interview GOV-M-3 (24 May 2014)
108 Idem. 
In 2014, this trend was even stronger. Several 
respondents quoted the Prosecutor of North Kivu’s 
estimate that 90% of the cases reported to police 
concern cases of copinage between two minors, or 
between a minor girl and a young man.109 In North Kivu, 
figures of the Division of Justice show that 60% of those 
imprisoned for sexual violence are aged between 18 and 
25.110 Interviewees in South Kivu mention that 80% of 
those in prison for sexual violence are young men (up to 
35 years of age). The vast majority of people in prison 
have not yet been prosecuted: 92% of all inmates in 
the Goma prison according to figures of the Division of 
Justice, while the situation in Bukavu prison probably 
little different. Many young men accused of rape are 
actually the boyfriend of the girl under 18 who was the 
‘victim’ of rape and have been arrested and imprisoned 
on that account. There are quite a number of accounts 
of cases where the girl stood by the accused and denied 
that sexual violence took place. 
The issue of minors concerns a dilemma. The law 
defines any attempt to have sex with a minor as a 
crime that should be prosecuted. A respondent put it 
in relation to a case involving a 17-year-old girl whose 
parents accused her boyfriend of rape. ‘Unfortunately 
the law does not allow her to love at that age.’ Judges 
differ in their interpretation of the law. Some magistrates 
maintain a strict interpretation, while others maintain 
that consensual relations of adolescents are not rape 
under certain circumstances. Organisations generally 
state it is not up to them to engage in a debate about 
whether the law is applied too strictly or is in need of 
reform as they operate in a sovereign nation state. It 
is not possible to determine if such cases are included 
in statistics on sexual violence or if they draw on 
assistance programmes for combatting sexual violence. 
5.5 A comparative analysis of sexual violence 
cases
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the large shifts in legal 
practice, legal action against sexual violence generated 
a lot of problems according to our 2011 research. 
Many faults were found in the 40 court cases that were 
examined, leading to the conclusion that there was too 
much pressure to convict in cases of sexual violence. In 
2014, these cases were revisited, and an additional 46 
109  Interview INGO-M-6 (26 May 2014); Interview GOV-M-4 (28 May 2014). 
110  Figures of the Goma prison for May 2014 show that there are 1,042 
prisoners in total. Approximately 300 are in prison for sexual violence (29% of the 
total in prison), of which nearly all are below 35 years of age. One third of these 
come from Goma, two thirds from rural areas. 
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recent court cases on sexual violence were examined 
in terms of the profile of the victims and accused, the 
proceedings and the evidence. The cases that resulted 
in 2011 in conviction (18) were also re-analysed. 
This section analyses 46 sexual violence cases 
originating from four different jurisdictions in South 
Kivu covering the period 2012-2013. The cases were 
taken from five courts, of which two were military. All 
cases that were introduced and concluded between 
2012-2013 and for which the file was physically present 
were included in the analysis. As our team was refused 
access to files at the level of the state prosecutor (where 
cases that did not make it to court can be found), it is 
difficult to compare the outcomes of cases judged with 
the overall number of cases reported. The data cannot 
be used to make any statistically significant claims 
about the overall quality of sexual violence proceedings 
in DRC. 
5.5.1 Details of the cases
The table below presents a summary overview of the 
cases.
Table 5: Overview of the cases – 2014 and reference to 2011 findings
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TMG – 1st 
(11 cases)
10 1 0 3 3 3 2 4 11 0 0 1 0 9113 1114
TGI (BKV)- 1st 
(8 cases)
6 1 1 5 1 0 1 1 7 0 1 8 0 5 4115
TGI (KVM) – 1st 
(8 cases)
6 1 0 5 1 1 0 1 8 0 0 8 0 7 1
CM – 2nd 
(9 cases)
9 9 2 2 5 0 0 0 8 1 0 0 1 9 0
CA – 2nd 
(10 cases)
5 1 0 8 1 0 0 0 10 0 0 2 2 7116 3
TOTAL 36 13 3 23 11 4 3 6 44 1 1 19 3 37 9
% in total in 2014
(46 cases)117
78 28 7 50 24 9 7 13 96 2 2 41 6.5 80 19
% in total in 2011
(40 cases)118
72 10 13 13 65 0 0 25 100 5 0 78 10 60 40
111 Explanation of abbreviations: TGI-BKV/KVM (Tribunal de Grande Instance, 
the Civil Court in respectively Bukavu and Kavumu), CA (Cour d’Appèl, the Civil 
High Appeal Court), TMG (Tribunal Militaire de Grande Instance, the Military 
Court), CM (Cour Militair, the Military High Appeal Court), PGI (Parquet de Grande 
Intance, the office of the Public Prosecutor).
112 Here we mainly refer to the medical report, by Congolese law considered to 
be a crucial element of proof.
113 In one of the cases the court (TMG) has refrained from pronouncing a 
judgment, declaring itself incompetent to deal with the case. This is also why the 
total of convictions and releases does not add up to 100%.  
114 In one of the cases where there were two accused, one has been convicted 
and the other acquitted. 
115 Idem. 
116 Two of these convictions concerns an indirect confirmation of the first-
degree conviction by the appeal court (CA) as it declared the appeal non-
receivable.
117 The percentages in the grey cells are calculated on the basis of 30 cases 
because those indicators concern prosecution, hence excluding the 10 cases of 
the PGI that were not prosecuted. 
118 Idem. 
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 ■ Type of sexual violence: All but two of the cases (N=46) 
concern charges of rape. As in 2011, rape charges are 
predominant in sexual violence cases. 
 ■ Relationship with the accused: In 2011, two-thirds of 
the cases concerned accused that were unknown to 
the victim. In 2014, this was only true for 24% of the 
cases. Half of the cases in 2014 concerned a family 
or friend. Half of these (12 cases) specifically mention 
the suspect was a ‘friend’, ‘boyfriend’, or ‘pseudo-
fiancé’. There was no such qualification in 2011, which 
confirms the trend from the interviews that cases 
of copinage are increasing. The remaining cases 
concern relatives, neighbours or professionals, such as 
teachers or doctors. 
 ■ Pregnancy: Compared to 2011, there are fewer cases 
where the victim was pregnant. All of these cases 
concern girls of 13-18 years old; four out of six cases 
were registered with the military tribunal. 
 ■ Age of victim and accused: In both samples, the vast 
majority of cases concerned minors. In 2011, however, 
half of the minors concerned children under 14 years 
old, whereas in 2014 80% were over 14, usually 16 or 
17. 15% of the accused are over 35 years of age, and 
28% of are under 25 years. In 2011, there were even 
more young men, around 50%.
 ■ Status of suspects: As in 2011, none of the studied 
cases included a suspect with a certain degree of 
wealth or status, confirming the frequently voiced 
criticism that people of power can escape responsibility 
for sexual violence (Human Rights Watch, 2009). In the 
18 military trials, 11 of the accused are foot soldiers, 
five are under-officers (up to lieutenant), and one is 
a policeman. Only two are officers. As for the civilian 
court cases, 11 cases concern unemployed men, five 
schoolboys or students, and five are said to have a job 
(driver, money exchanger and hospital nurse). 
 ■ Legal timeframe: The legal timeframe for treatment of 
sexual violence cases is a maximum of three months 
from instruction to judgement, according to the law. 
In both samples, this was rarely respected. It should 
be noted that the delays in most cases are caused 
by the pre-judicial phase. There seems to have been 
no improvement, as the average procedure took 6.5 
months in 2011 and 9.5 months in 2014. Still, sexual 
violence cases are generally handled and concluded 
faster than other offenses, which may linger on for 
years.
 ■ Evidence present in files: The most important piece of 
evidence expected to be present in a sexual violence 
file is the medical attestation with evidence of rape. 
Other elements of proof include proof of school 
enrolment, birth certificates, medical leaflets, identity 
cards, or objects gathered at crime scene. In 2011, 
75% of all first- and second-degree cases lacked a 
medical report. None of the convictions were based 
on a medical report. 
 ■ In comparison to this, the 2014 analysis shows the 
following:
 – 41% of the cases lacked a medical report. 
Though still a high percentage, it is a significant 
improvement from 75% in 2011. 
 – None of the first-degree cases dealt with by the 
civil courts (TGI Bukavu and Kavumu) contain 
a medical examination report. Once a medical 
attestation was used to prove minority of the 
victim. No other pieces of evidence appear to 
have been present in the first-degree files of the 
TGI either (except for a school bulletin and a birth 
certificate in two files). This means that in 13 
cases no element of proof was presented in the 
file (of which 10 resulted in conviction). 
 – In contrast, all of the cases dealt with at first 
degree by the military tribunal (TMG) contain a 
medical report. Three files also contain witness 
testimonies. 
 – Out of the 19 cases dealt with in the appeal, for 
both the civil and military court, all but two have a 
medical report on file. In two cases clothing was 
seized on the crime scene. 
 ■ Conclusion of cases: In 2014, 80% of the cases 
resulted in conviction and 17% in acquittal of the 
suspect. In 2011, convictions were 60%. As in 2011, 
almost all of the military cases studied (N=20) 
resulted in conviction, so the increase is account of 
the civilian court outcomes. 
 ■ Reasons to release: In the nine cases of acquittal, 
the judges’ arguments were relatively well developed 
(as they were in 2011), especially for those dealt with 
in appeal. The reasons for acquittal included cases 
where bystanders or people trying to help the victim 
had been arrested, the absence of a medical report, 
and the fact the victim was absent during the hearing 
or unclear in her testimony. 
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 ■ Reasons to convict: On first-degree convictions, 
reasons put forward by the tribunals (both civil and 
military, 27 cases in total) are diverse and sometimes 
presented in combination. In two cases the suspect 
admitted to rape. In one of the cases a suspect was 
captured in the act and in one case the presence of a 
witness was used. In the six cases where pregnancy 
was involved, the pregnancy itself was used as 
argument to convict. In all of these cases the suspect 
admitted to being the father of the child, which the 
court took as an indirect admission of rape. The 
medical report was cited 11 times as key reason 
for conviction. In three cases the tribunal based its 
decision solely on the police report. 
As for the appeal courts (both military and civil), the 
medical report was used as a reason to convict in 
seven cases, in combination with a witness statement 
(four times) and a guilty plea (twice). Twice the 
testimony of the victim was given as a reason. In five 
cases the judge only confirmed the opinion of the first-
degree judge without complementary reasons. What 
stands out in comparison to 2011 is that the judges’ 
arguments seem to be more developed. 
 ■ Prison penalties: There were 37 convictions at 
the first-degree level and cases treated in appeal. 
According to the law, the minimum sentence for 
sexual violence is five years. Nonetheless, six 
cases got penalties of less than five years, of which 
the lowest was three months. Five cases got the 
maximum penalty of 20 years and one case applied 
capital punishment. The remaining 25 cases got 
penalties of between 5 and 20 years. This spread is 
similar to the 2011 findings. The average penalties 
pronounced differ by jurisdiction. As in 2011, military 
courts were more severe (TMG on average 12 years, 
and the Military Court [CM] on average 16 years) 
than civil courts (TGI Bukavu on average 5 years, TGI 
Kavumu 9 years and the CA on average 5.6 years). 
 ■ Fines and compensation. Of the 37 convictions, 
32 (first-degree judgement) were convicted with 
legal fees/penalties ranging widely between $13 
and $1,100 ($150 on average). This is slightly lower 
than the $230 average of 2011. For 34 convictions 
compensation payments were requested, ranging 
$90 to $15,000 (on average $3,200, which is higher 
than the $2,030 average in 2011). The TGI in Kavumu 
and the have a particular tendency to pronounce high 
compensation payments of thousands of dollars. 
None of the files included documents proving the 
actual payment of compensation. The enactment of 
compensation requires a civil procedure for which 
the victim is expected to pay 6% of the allocated 
sum in advance. This is often impossible for victims, 
especially the poorest. Also, many of the convicted are 
incapable of paying and the state has never paid in 
military cases. Legal redress through compensation is 
just as problematic as it was in 2011. 
 ■ Results of higher appeal: Of the cases that were 
dealt with in the higher appeal court (civil and 
military) (N=19), three civil convictions (Cour 
d’Appel – CA) were nullified because of doubtful 
evidence. In two cases the CA vastly reduced the 
penalty on appeal. One case was reduced from 7 
years to 11 months because a witness declared 
that the victim consented and enjoyed the act. One 
case was reduced from 11 years to 15 months for 
extenuating circumstances. The suspect in this case 
was a student of nearly the same age as the victim 
(23 and 24). In the absence of a medical report this 
did not appear to be forced rape. Based on these 
arguments, it is unclear why these sentences were 
not nullified on appeal. As for the CM, no penalty 
was nullified, but for three cases the penalties were 
reduced by a number of years. For all the other 
second-degree cases the higher court confirmed 
first-degree penalties. The CM has a tendency to 
raise penalties on second-degree cases. Unlike 
2011, when none of the higher appeal cases involved 
complementary research and merely confirmed 
what was pronounced at first degree, now the appeal 
cases demonstrate a more thorough examination of 
the elements of proof in file – although there were 
still no cases where complementary investigations or 
new elements of proof were brought in. 
The legal expert conducting the analysis of the cases 
assessed the overall quality of the proceedings in each 
case. Overall, she observed an improvement in the quality 
in how cases have been dealt with and presented. The 
TGI first-degree level continues to have low-quality files 
without elements of evidence, but in the other courts 
the arguments put forward by judges to convict or acquit 
are better developed. The respect of the legal timeframe 
remains very weak, especially at the CA/CM level.
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Table 6: Overall quality of proceedings of cases studied
Jurisdiction No. of 
cases 
studied
Quality of 
proceedings
Respect of 
timeframe 
observed
TGI (Bukavu 
and Kavumu)
16 2 cases (12.5%) 10 cases (62.5%)
TMG 11 4 cases (36%) 10 cases (91%)
CA 10 9 cases (90%) 2 cases (20%)
CM 9 8 cases (89%) 3 cases (33%)
5.5.2 The 2011 cases re-analysed
Eighteen convictions that occurred with the cases that 
were studied in 2011 were reviewed again to assess 
whether prison terms are respected.119 The starting 
date of the first-degree trial is considered the start of the 
prison term (sexual violence suspects are not allowed 
bail awaiting their trial). The following stands out:
 ■ Five out of the 18 cases had officially finished their 
sentence by the time of this analysis. Their terms had 
ended between late-2011 and mid-2012 (with one 
finishing in September 2013), yet four out of the five 
were still in prison in mid-2014, meaning they had 
served at least two additional years. 
 ■ According to Congo’s laws, after having served a 
quarter of the prison term conditional liberty can be 
requested. None of the cases have been granted 
conditional liberty. Twelve cases that are eligible have 
formally requested conditional liberty. Of these, three 
were refused on the basis of ‘bad behaviour’ and nine 
never received a response to their request. It is to be 
noted that legislation restricting the rights of sexual 
violence convicts was effected after the analysis, in 
2014, so these prisoners would have been eligible for 
conditional liberty. 
 ■ Of the 18 cases, 14 were also ordered to the pay 
compensation to the victim (on average $1,700). 
None of the files, however, include proof of payment. 
 ■ Of those convicted whose term had not yet finished 
(13), all but one were still in prison. The one that 
was no longer in prison concerns a military case. 
It is unclear if he escaped or if corruption was 
involved. His case was among those with the highest 
possible sentence (20 years) and he had the highest 
compensation to pay ($8,000). There is a persistent 
idea that convicted perpetrators escape en masse 
119  There were 19 convictions in 2011 but one file could not be found.
from prison. Even if this true for higher-ranking or 
influential people (whose cases would not have 
appeared in our sample because their files would 
have conveniently disappeared), for poorer people 
our sample indicates the contrary. 
5.6 Social practices around legal cases on 
sexual violence
In 2011, there were different stories and rumours 
that indicated that knowledge of the sexual violence 
law brought about a practice of people bending the 
law to their own interest, either to settle conflicts or to 
criminalise consensual relationships for economic gain. 
There were many stories in Bukavu and Goma about 
how consensual relationships or conflicts were framed 
as rape. One woman said: ‘In our neighbourhood, nearly 
all pregnancies of unmarried girls are sooner or later 
transformed into a sexual violence case. In my opinion, 
rape is abused to get money’ (Douma and Hilhorst, 2012: 
53). An NGO representative summarised the situation 
as: ‘The severity of the law is abused; intimidations and 
requests for money are widely present. People know that 
someone will “tremble” once accused of sexual violence 
and is immediately ready to give some money’ (ibid). 
The research in 2014 found more traces of the social 
appropriation of legal action on sexual violence. As 
mentioned above, the law on sexual violence criminalises 
any type of sexual relation with a person under the age of 
18. Parents who don’t like the boyfriend of their daughter 
can easily accuse him of rape if she is below 18. When 
a girl becomes pregnant, there are numerous accounts 
of parents filing a rape case in the hope that legal 
proceedings might help them claim compensation. There 
are also examples of evidence of age being altered when 
the girl in question is over 18. 
In 2011 our report mentioned a controversy that had 
risen in Bukavu around the Police d’Enfance et la Lutte 
contre les Violences Sexuelles (PNC-PELVS), led by one 
of the highest-ranking and most internationally praised 
female police officers in DRC. A number of people claimed 
that the unit was involved in staging sexual violence for 
corrupt purposes, and this time around the rumours 
appeared to have swollen. People told us that many 
people in Bukavu know of a man being set up for rape 
in their social network. Examples come from all levels in 
society. A group of youths interviewed in Bukavu say that 
they hear of such cases at least once every two weeks.
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An additional rumour that gained strength is that this 
officer or her direct family owns a bar-nightclub called 
Espace Schengen in one of the poorer neighbourhoods 
of Bukavu where a lot of prostitution is alleged to go on. 
For this research we held a focus group with four young 
women who work as prostitutes in this particular bar. 
The girls deny that minors work in the bar as prostitutes, 
but without the researcher asking them about this police 
officer, they came up with the following testimony: 
When we are in the Schengen bar that is owned by 
[name], and we encounter a man that does not want 
to pay you for our services, we call [name]. She then 
arrives with her policemen and they arrest the man in 
question. We have to go with her to the police station 
so that we can file a complaint. She says it is rape. For 
the situation to be solved, the man has to pay. I think 
that when she talks about rape, she really talks about 
us, because ‘elle mange chez nous’.
In the focus group with citizens in Bukavu, participants 
said this had affected courtship in the city. Students 
said that when a guy has set his eyes on a pretty girl, 
friends will tell him: ‘So you are not afraid of [name]?’120 
In another focus group with urban poor women, a woman 
said: ‘You hear parents in our area say: why don’t you 
cope like the other girls and find a man to accuse of rape?’ 
Below the surface of actual court cases, a reality seems 
to have evolved where people can take advantage of the 
fear of prosecution. Men who are accused, whether they 
know the girl or not, have no choice but to pay their way 
out of a threat of accusation. Threats to accuse a man of 
rape are also used in nightclubs, for example when a man 
does not pay what he owes a sex worker.121 
Cases of abuse and fake police cases over sexual 
violence claims may result in ordinary citizens 
underestimating the existence of real sexual violence. 
In the early days, we were really happy to see 
organisations that came to help victims. But when 
we saw that people started to abuse the problem, the 
perception towards sexual violence changed. People 
now just don’t give a damn. … It becomes difficult 
to believe a woman that has really been raped and 
people will say: Uko natafuta makuta tu (you only 
look for money).
120  Focus group-5, Bukavu citizens (23 May 2014). 
121  Focus group-4, Female sex workers from a Bukavu nightclub (23 May 2014). 
Conclusion
This section has detailed the findings on legal action 
against sexual violence. With regard to interventions 
against impunity, it appears that approaches have 
broadened from a focus on prosecution (whereby actions 
were concentrated on the provision of legal assistance to 
victims) to increasingly include system-wide institutional 
capacity building. Regardless, the Congolese justice 
system is still widely mistrusted. The deterrent effect of 
prosecution should not be overestimated, nor should it be 
the main motivation for legal support to sexual violence 
cases. 
In 2011, the state of legal action was found to be dismal. 
A major finding of the current research is that court 
proceedings have improved compared to 2011, at least 
in the appeal courts. There have also been substantial 
improvements in the organisation of mobile courts to 
restore their independence, respect the rights of the 
accused by ensuring they have access to legal counsel 
and better coordinate the courts. There continue to be 
problems, especially in the pre-judicial phase where 
police investigations are slow and lack rigour. The 
performance of courts has improved.
There are still concerns with the rights of the accused. 
The percentage of the cases resulted in conviction in the 
2014 analysis is higher than in 2011, and stands at 80%. 
Cases involving minors (below the age of 18) constitute 
the vast majority of cases that are reported to the police 
and prosecution level. A number of these cases concern 
young couples where a boyfriend is accused against 
the wishes of the girl. For those cases that do make it to 
court, judges are struggling with these cases, with some 
punishing severely and others refusing such cases. The 
rights of prisoners are disrespected when it comes to 
conditional liberty, where the majority of requests hardly 
receive an answer. In the sample of 2011 were five cases 
where the sentence of the convicted had elapsed. Four of 
them were still in prison more than two years after their 
sentences had been served. 
Finally, we found that the legal approach to sexual 
violence has created some disturbing social practices in 
urban centres, where the threat of being accused of rape 
has become a way to extort money. 
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This report has analysed how the responses to sexual 
violence have taken shape in DRC and how they have 
evolved over the past few years. It followed research 
done in 2011 that produced evidence of a number of 
weaknesses and perverse effects in the response to 
sexual violence. The title of the previous report, Fond de 
commerce, reflected a general view among respondents 
that the abundant and largely uncoordinated funding 
for action against sexual violence had resulted in a 
situation where different actors could profit from the 
political attention and funds available. A number of these 
shortcomings were observed in other articles and reports 
on DRC.
Follow-up research is important to observe changes in 
practice and to identify areas where further efforts to 
strengthen the response is required. Sexual violence 
in various forms continues to affect the lives of many in 
DRC. Conflict-related rape still occurs in some areas and 
gender-based violence in civilian and domestic settings is 
a widespread phenomenon. 
This report addressed the following questions:
 ■ How has the engagement of responding actors and 
their approaches to sexual violence in eastern DRC 
evolved since 2011?
 ■ How have practices of sexual violence assistance 
evolved in eastern DRC?
 ■ What are the social effects of increased legal action 
against sexual violence in urban areas of eastern 
DRC? 
How has the engagement of responding actors 
and their approaches to sexual violence in eastern 
DRC evolved over the past few years?
Looking back at the sexual violence response in eastern 
DRC, we can see that it mounted up from 2008 and 
reached enormous proportions by 2012. We have been 
hesitant to refer to the response as ‘hype’, but the term 
has been used by Eriksson-Baaz and Stern (2013) among 
others. The urgent calls for action led to a response where 
hundreds of agencies started engaging in sexual violence 
response, largely uncoordinated.
In 2011, we observed many perverse effects including 
the misuse of funds at all levels of society. Poor women 
could only find services and support from programmes 
for sexual violence victims; citizens started using sexual 
violence court cases to extort money or take revenge 
for other forms of injustice; doctors could only treat 
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fistula patients under sexual violence funds; local NGOs 
survived by pushing their sexual violence ‘expertise’; and 
international agencies raised funds by presenting ever-
larger numbers on sexual violence. One of the damaging 
effects was that local actors increasingly disengaged 
from the issue of sexual violence, considering it an 
‘international thing’ and suspecting victims of faking 
it. Another damaging effect was that the attention to 
sexual violence threw many other important issues in the 
shadow, including other types of violence.
Hype never lasts, and one of the questions in the back 
of our minds was how it would end? Would the negatives 
become more dominant? Would the hype bring about 
positive effects in the end? Could it be the beginning of 
serious attention to gender issues in DRC?
Attention to sexual violence has become more regulated 
in many ways in the past three years. Coordination has 
improved. The coordination and engagement of the 
Congolese government has also improved, yet remains 
relatively minor. Funding has gone down, which may 
have negative effects but also some positive ones as 
the number of quick-and-dirty projects and NGOs that 
suddenly develop expertise on sexual violence has also 
gone down.
The approach of actors dealing with sexual violence has 
also changed. There is more recognition that conflict was 
not the only cause of sexual violence, and attention has 
shifted to gender relations and violence against women 
by civilians. A number of Congolese NGOs that were once 
at the forefront of action against sexual violence have 
now completely shifted to other gender issues. In general, 
there is much more attention being paid to other forms 
of gender-based violence, women’s empowerment and 
leadership. The focus is now much less on women-as-
victims, and has become more complete. Victim-oriented 
support has largely transformed into community-based 
responses. There is also more recognition of other 
medical needs. The fact that 95% of fistula is childbirth-
related is now recognised. 
While these changes are happening on the ground, the 
international representation of gender-based violence 
remains largely unchanged. An international summit in 
2014 centred on the rape-as-a-weapon-of-war narrative, 
most international NGOs’ websites continue to focus 
on conflict-related violence, and many programmes, 
notwithstanding the broader approach in practice, 
continue to fall under the response to sexual violence. A 
few actors now engage in gender programming without 
referring to sexual violence. Often, the discrepancy 
between international rhetoric and the realities of 
interventions on the ground are large. This is problematic 
from an ethical point of view, comes at the expense 
of transparency, and makes it difficult to scrutinise 
programmes for their effectiveness.
Attention to continuing conflict-related sexual 
violence appears to be overshadowed. Interventions 
overwhelmingly happen in more reachable areas, not 
where the conflicts occur. The very problem that triggered 
the response (and still dominates international narratives) 
tends thus to be under-serviced. Attention to other-
than-sexual violence has not increased and the plight 
of male victims is not addressed. The commitment to 
resolving the causes of conflict-related violence, through 
peacebuilding or security sector reform, appears to have 
ebbed.
How have practices of sexual violence assistance 
evolved in eastern DRC?
Compared to 2011, we see many improvements in the 
response to sexual violence, especially in the key domains 
of the medical and legal response. This is not to say there 
are no problems. The situation in the legal domain was 
dismal in 2011, with a vast majority of cases leading 
to conviction without a shred of evidence. It is thus a 
big improvement to see that 13-36% of our sample of 
first-degree cases qualified as satisfactory, even though 
this means that the majority of cases still lack proper 
documentation. Our samples are moreover biased in a 
positive direction, as we can only study cases where a file 
exists. In a similar vein, we see improved respect for the 
rights of suspects, while concerns remain. Nonetheless, 
these are positive developments when we compare the 
two samples.
Issues persist in the medical domain, especially with 
the general capacities of health care in DRC. Recent 
years saw the country flooded with PEP kits supplied 
a numerous actors responding in an uncoordinated 
fashion, leading to the disorderly use of the kits. This has 
now been brought under control. 
A major issue concerns the overall strategy for responses 
to sexual violence. There are initiatives, now boosted by a 
large programme of the World Bank, to create a one-stop 
approach where victims of sexual violence can find all the 
services they need. This risks creating a parallel system 
for sexual violence response throughout the provinces. 
An alternative approach, favoured by USAID for example, 
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is to strengthen the general medical facilities. Interwoven 
with this discussion about approaches is a discussion on 
cost-recovery that permeates the entire health sector. 
Health care in DRC is based on cost-recovery. Sexual 
violence is exempted and provided for free. However, this 
is only the case for medical treatment directly related 
to the sexual violence. Specialised hospitals using the 
one-stop approach like Panzi provide all care for free. At 
the moment, both these different approaches are being 
developed as long as donors are interested, and there 
is no clear policy that takes into account the question of 
sustainable healthcare. 
Other domains, like psycho-social care and socio-
economic reintegration, are less developed. While UN 
statistics show a remarkably high coverage of psycho-
social care, there is very little verifiable insight in the 
methods used and their effects. Socio-economic 
reintegration seems to consist of high-level support for 
a few, and highly insignificant projects for many. Mutual 
help and saving groups are often encouraged, but it is 
unclear how helpful this is for responding to dire poverty 
in DRC. Efforts at capacity development, likewise, are not 
well monitored. Capacity development is part of every 
domain of intervention, yet it seems to escape scrutiny 
from the different coordinating bodies. 
Reviewing responses to sexual violence strengthens the 
notion of a mismatch between discourse and practice 
in this field. This is seen in the relative under-servicing 
of areas where conflict and related sexual violence 
continues. It is also seen in reduced attention to root 
causes of such violence, expressed through security 
sector reform and peacebuilding. It is also seen in the 
legal domain. The urgent need to fighting impunity for 
sexual violence has led to a legal practice where sexual 
violence cases are being tried based on the 2006 law 
on sexual violence. A majority of cases involve girls of 
minor age, of which a large number concerns consensual 
relationships with boyfriends or sugar daddies. Sexual 
intercourse with any woman under 18 is punishable by 
law, and there are incidents of prosecution against the will 
of the ‘victim’. Protection of young women is interspersed 
with moral convictions about sexuality and runs counter 
to social practices where many girls are sexually active 
before their 18th birthday. It is questionable whether 
those who urged the fight against impunity had this effect 
in mind.
What are the social effects of increased legal 
action against sexual violence in urban areas of 
eastern DRC?
As detailed above, the increased legal action against sexual 
violence is to a large extent manifested in cases concerning 
young women who have engaged in sexual relations before 
the age of 18 years. This affects young men, who fear 
the threat of prosecution (and the possible 15 years of 
imprisonment) when they have a girlfriend, especially when 
she becomes pregnant. The legalisation of sexuality is not 
matched with equal efforts to educate youths about the use 
of contraceptives or the pros and cons of early relationships.
There are also many stories of how the fight against 
impunity is used by citizens and law enforcers to extort 
money. Threats to prosecute can be give vulnerable 
women a line of defence, such as prostitutes using them 
to force their clients to pay. It can also be a means of 
survival in poor conditions: we quoted one student whose 
mother told her: ‘Why don’t you cope like everybody else, 
and find a man you can accuse of rape’? 
Rumours that the police stages cases for corrupt gain 
are widespread and sustained by people from all levels in 
society, especially in Bukavu and in relation to the police 
force that specialises on sexual violence (PELVS). These 
rumours are often based on first-hand knowledge (when 
for example the narrator’s cousin or neighbour was put 
to prison or forced to pay) and were sustained by a focus 
group of girls working in nightclubs.
The fight against impunity has thus found a way in the 
political economy of survival and corruption, especially 
in the cities of eastern DRC. The citizen disengagement 
with the issue of sexual violence detected in 2011 has 
become stronger as a result. People tend not to take the 
issue seriously and expect women to accuse for personal 
gain. This results in the negative opinion many people 
have of aid agencies as ‘bouffer’ – eating the money they 
receive rather than spending it on the population.
Conclusion
The response to sexual violence in eastern DRC peaked 
around 2012, but since then a reduction has set in. 
In 2011, many perverse effects were observed, as it 
invited misuse of funds at all levels of society. One of 
the questions informing this report was how this would 
continue? Would the negative effects become more 
dominant? Or could this hype usher in more serious 
attention to gender issues in DRC?
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We find that attention to sexual violence has indeed 
become more regulated and coordination has improved, 
including with regard to the engagement of the Congolese 
government. The approaches of actors dealing with 
sexual violence have changed. There has been more 
attention for other forms of gender-based violence, 
women’s empowerment and leadership. Victim-oriented 
support has largely transformed into community-based 
responses. There is also more recognition of other 
medical needs. However, the discrepancy between 
international rhetoric and realities on the ground is large, 
with international representations still focusing on the 
conflict-related rape. This is problematic from an ethical 
point of view, comes at the expense of transparency, 
and makes it difficult to scrutinise programmes for their 
effectiveness. The gap between the discourse and 
practice of sexual violence response has been widened. 
A major concern remains that the fight against impunity 
has found a way in the political economy of survival and 
corruption, especially in the cities, where accusations of 
sexual violence are often used for revenge or extortion. 
Citizen disengagement with the issue of sexual violence 
has become stronger as a result. 
Recommendations
The findings lead to the following recommendations.
 ■ Be more transparent about sexual violence response 
International agencies should review their narratives 
and adjust the conflict-related sexual violence 
discourse to better match it both to local realities 
and the work they are currently doing. More precise 
analyses of how programmes are expected to 
contribute to change (systematic use of theories of 
change, for instance) will enable more internal and 
external scrutiny of the effectiveness of aid.
 ■ Develop a comprehensive policy on sexual violence 
response 
The government together with the UN should develop 
a clear strategy on sexual violence response and 
clarify how the creation of parallel services through 
one-stop approaches relates to policy perspectives on 
the health system. This should also include discussion 
of free service provision.
 ■ Be more transparent on fistula operations 
Thanks to the attention to sexual violence there are 
now two hospitals specialised in the complex fistula 
operations, allowing hundreds of women to receive 
surgery to repair the damage caused by fistula. 
Notwithstanding the enormous benefits of these 
services, it is important to become more transparent 
about its causes, which should lead to more attention 
to reproductive health care and the prevention of 
teenage pregnancy. 
 ■ Review sectoral sexual violence response 
Although the response to sexual violence is not as 
overwhelming as it was between 2008 and 2012, it 
continues to be substantial, involving a large amount 
of public funding and private donations. Interviews 
with workers in the sector raise concerns that ought 
to be externally and transparently evaluated. Topics 
that stand out are:
 – Methods and effectiveness of psycho-social 
response
 – Practices and effectiveness of training facilities
 – Coverage and effectiveness of sexual violence 
response in armed encounters or rebel attacks
 – Attention to male victims of sexual violence. 
 ■ Continue capacity development of the medical and 
legal sector 
Despite improvements in medical and legal 
responses, capacity development is of paramount 
importance in these sectors. This is a much broader 
concern than sexual violence alone. The Congolese 
health sector has an enormous capacity deficit. In the 
legal sector, special attention needs to be given to 
pre-judicial investigative capacities and the respect 
for rights of suspects of violence.
 ■ Have an honest discussion on the social effects of 
the fight against impunity 
As a result of the attention now paid to fighting 
impunity, many cases are brought to court that in fact 
concern cases of copinage (consensual relations). 
The question is if this desirable. The exclusively 
legal approach to sexual violence should at least be 
accompanied by more educational approaches on 
contraceptives.
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Annex 1: Resource persons
As many of the respondents requested that their points 
of view were to be taken into consideration as individual 
points of view, not engaging the organisation they 
work for, it has been decided to quote respondents in 
a coded manner. The coding system makes reference 
to the gender of the respondent (F/M) and the type 
of organisation they work for: UN (UN agency), INGO 
(international NGO), CNGO (Congolese NGO) and GOV 
(government agency). Each respondent has also been 
given a number, hence resulting in coding like GOV-F-1, 
INGO-M-6, CNGO-F-3 or UN-M-4. 
The following organisations and institutes have been 
interviewed. On some occasions more than one person 
was present during the interview, for other structures a 
number of employees were interviewed separately, hence 
resulting in the total number of 51 interviews and 8 focus 
groups. The numerical part of the coding does not reflect 
the order in which they are presented below and has been 
attributed at random. Those marked with (**) concern 
the same organisations/persons as interviewed in 2011 
(those marked with * concern the same organisation but 
a different staff member). 
Bukavu: 
UN structures: MONUSCO-SGBV*, UNICEF*, UNWOMEN, 
UNDP, UNJHRO
Government: Cours d’Appel*, Police PELVS**, Provincial 
Gender Division**, Provincial Social Affairs Division, 
Provincial Assembly Members, Customary authority 
(Mwami)
INGOs: American Bar Association (ABA)**, Avocats Sans 
Frontières (ASF)*, International Medical Corps (IMC), 
RCN, International Rescue Committee (IRC), GIZ/Health, 
Médicins Sans Frontières, TPO DRC, International Alert*, 
V-Day/City of Joy
CNGOs: Panzi Foundation**, Caucus des Femmes, 
RFDP**, CAMPS**, Centre Olame, Arche d’Alliance
Goma: 
UN structures: MONUSCO-SGBV*, UNICEF*, UNHCR*, 
UNFPA*
Government: Public prosecutor, Provincial gender 
division*, Provincial Justice Division*, Provincial Assembly 
Members 
INGOs: Médicins Sans Frontières-Holland (MSF), ICRC, 
Uhaki Safi, International Alert, American Bar Association 
(ABA)**, IMA World Health, Finn Church Aid*, Heal Africa*
CNGOs: DFJ**, SFVS**, Congo Men Network, IFEDI
Kinshasa:
Donor organisations: Swiss Embassy, Norwegian 
Embassy, Netherlands Embassy, DFID.
Annexes
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Annex 2: Data collection tools
Framework for the legal analysis of sexual violence cases
 ■ Quantitative analysis: 
 – Nombre d’acquittements, nombre de condamnations 
(et à quel peine), nombre de dossiers classés sans 
suite, durée de la procédure (instruction par chambre 
foraine ou pas), type d’infraction, type d’acteur, l’âge 
de la victime (mineure ou majeure), nombre de cas 
traités en appel
 ■ Qualitative analysis: 
 – Quels cas sont conclus par une condamnation alors 
que les éléments de preuves présentés dans les 
dossiers devraient amener le tribunal à acquitter
 – Quels sont les cas conclu par un acquittement alors 
que les éléments de preuves présentés dans le 
dossier devraient amener le tribunal à condamner
 – Pour quels cas des pièces manquent (et lesquels 
pièces, quel est leur importance, pourquoi ça 
manque dans le dossier – est-ce que c’est une 
instruction incomplet ou par volonté/corruption)
 – Est-ce qu’il existe de pièces dans un ou plusieurs 
dossiers qui ont l’allure d’être fabriqué, comment le 
savoir
 – Pour les cas qui ont été traités en appel, est-ce 
qu’il existe des incompatibilités par rapport aux 
arguments/faits présentés (nouveaux éléments, 
éléments changés)
 – Qu’est-ce qu’on constate par rapport au nombre de 
cas ou la victime n’a pas été remise dans ces droits 
(acquittement, légère peine, présumé pris fuite)
 – Qu’est-ce qu’on peut observer par rapport au 
traitement juridiques des cas jugés en chambre 
foraine ? (eg. durée, profondeur de l’enquête, 
influence des ONGs, effets)
 – Qu’est-ce qu’on constate (différence, comparaison) 
par rapport aux cas traités par la justice militaire et 
ceux traités par la justice civile
 – Qu’est-ce qu’on constate (différences, comparaison) 
par rapport aux cas traités par le tribunal de grande 
instance et ceux traités par le tribunal de Kavumu
 – Sur base des cas étudies (ou votre expérience 
personnel), quels généralisations ou analyses 
peuvent être faits par rapport à la légèreté, 
l’influence de corruption, trafic d’influence et les 
faux condamnations qui peuvent exister au tour de 
dossiers de violences sexuelles
 – Quel est le statut actuel des cas qui étaient 
condamnés, analysés en 2011 (exécution du 
jugement, condamné toujours en prison)? 
Please note that not all the questions above have been 
answered or dealt with in detail in the judicial analysis. 
On the basis of the file analysis it proved impossible to 
formulate a conclusive response to some of the questions. 
Literature review 
Definitions
1 How is sexual violence defined? Is attention paid to the 
‘root causes’ of the problem?
2 Which man/woman images are (implicitly) used?
Humanitarian aid and side effects
3 Which possible solutions and response strategies are 
mentioned in order to restrain sexual violence? (For 
example medical aid, psychosocial aid, livelihood.)
4 Is there attention paid to the juridical facets of 
the problem? What legal response strategies are 
mentioned?
Actors in the field
5 Who are the actors and why? (What are the tasks of 
(local) NGOs and the government?)
6 To what extent are the Congolese government and/
or Congolese organisations involved in the response 
strategies?
Evidence and claims
7 Are the claims that are made in accordance with the 
scope of the research?
8 Can there be seen a pattern in the used source (expert 
knowledge)? Are some sources used more than 
others? Are these sources reliable?
Authors
9 Who has written the text? Is this author bound to any 
institution?
Analysis/patterns
10 Which causes are mentioned for sexual violence?
11 How does the text reflect on humanitarian aid? Is there 
attention paid to side effects of humanitarian aid?
12 Which patterns can be seen in the way sexual violence 
is analysed? Which patterns can be found in the 
positions taken by the authors?
Getting the balance right?
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Annex 3: Keywords used in N-vivo
Context DR Congo
Conflict / context analysis / development / economy / 
general information / politics / stabilisation
Gender and perceptions
Cultural practices / development / general violence 
/ mainstreaming / male engagement / poverty and 
unemployment / sexual violence (civil / military) / 
status of women / gender based violence / women 
leadership / women’s movement 
Fonds de commerce
Reactions to 2011 research 
Statistics
Strategies and policies
Code de la famille / constitution / gender policy / 
ISSSS / legislation / protocols / provincial level / 
SGBV strategy 2009 / STAREC / UN resolutions 
Responses to SV
Approaches / capacity building / challenges / 
changes / community approaches / confidentiality 
/ coverage / donor driven responses / emergency 
response / fake cases / future / history / integrated 
approach / malpractice / minors / results / 
suggestions / unintended consequences 
Legal interventions 
Activities / amiable solutions / bar association / 
capacities / case balance / challenges / chambres 
foraines / changes / CIDA UNDP / Colonel Honorine / 
compensation / corruption / EU Uhaki Safi / impunity 
/ international justice / military versus civilian justice 
/ minors / Minova case / monitoring / neutrality 
judges / OPJ level / prison / prosecutor / reform / 
results / suggestions / unintended consequences 
Medical interventions
Activities / broader health concerns / capacities / 
challenges / changes / fistulas / free health care / 
medical certificate / PEP kits / reproductive health / 
results / sexual violence / suggestions / unintended 
consequences / World Bank Panzi 
Protection and prevention interventions
Activities / awareness raising / challenges / changes 
/ education / lobby and advocacy / protection / 
results / suggestions / unintended consequences 
Psychosocial interventions
Activities / approaches / capacities / challenges 
/ changes / results / suggestions / unintended 
consequences 
Socio-economic interventions
Activities / capacities / challenges / changes / 
micro credits / results / suggestions / unintended 
consequences 
Actors
Armed actors / beneficiaries / children born from SV 
/ civil society / communities / customary chiefs / 
donors / government national / government provincial 
/ INGOs and UN / international community / male 
victims / media / perpetrators / public opinion / 
religious / youth 
Organisations 
ABA / International Alert / Arche d’Alliance / ASF 
/ Assembly / BCNUDH / CAMPS / Centre Olame 
/ Congo Men Network / Cordaid / DFID / DFJ / 
Norwegian Embassy / Finn Church Aid / GIZ / Harvard 
Humanitarian Initiative / Heal Africa / Hillary Clinton 
/ ICRC / IFEDI / World Health / IMC / IRC / Mary 
Robinson / Medicins du Monde / MONUSCO / MSF / 
NL Embassy / Panzi / RCN / Rejusco / RFDP / Swiss 
Embassy / UN women / UNDP / UNFPA / UNHCR / 
UNICEF / UNWOMEN / USAID / Ushindi / V-day / WFP 
/ World Bank
Coordination structures
Coordination / changes / civil society coordination 
/ donor coordination / governance and evaluation / 
provincial CPLVS / psycho-social network / results / 
taskforce civilian justice / taskforce military justice / 
UN cluster working groups 
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Annex 4: Map of rebel groups in North and South Kivu
Source: Situation in autumn 2014, 
http://christophvogel.net/congo/mapping
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